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ABSTRACT 
Two Essays on Monetary Union and International Finance. (August 2005) 
Nai-Wei Chen, B.S., National Sun Yat-Sen University; 
M.S., Texas A&M University 
Co-Chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Thomas Saving 
       Dr. Arvind Mahajan 
This dissertation studies the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and its 
effects on foreign exchange markets and corporate cash holdings. These two potential 
effects are examined in the dissertation in two separate essays.   
 The first essay examines the validity of the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
condition during three distinct exchange rate regimes (floating-rate, target-zone 
arrangement, and fixed-rate or common currency) from January 1973 through January 
2004. My results support PPP, but I find that PPP during the common currency regime 
holds in fewer EMU countries than during the alternative exchange rate regimes. In 
addition, PPP between currency blocs holds for all countries examined during the first 
two regimes, but deteriorates after the introduction of the euro for the EMU countries as 
opposed to the non-EMU countries. I do not obtain strong evidence supporting PPP for 
the EMU countries since the euro adoption, but the faster mean reversion I observe in 
the few EMU countries where PPP does hold, may signal higher market efficiency and 
economic integration in the future. 
The second essay investigates corporate liquidity (cash holdings of firms) from 
15 European Union (EU) countries [12 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries 
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that adopted the euro, and 3 non-EMU countries] from 1993 to 2002 using a dynamic 
panel data model. My main contributions to the corporate liquidity literature are four-
fold. First, I provide evidence that creditor rights also affect corporate liquidity and their 
effect is more consistent than that of shareholder rights. Second, I show that the recent 
formation of EMU affects corporate liquidity. Debt and net working capital are better 
substitutes for cash in EMU countries than non-EMU countries. The adoption of a 
common currency reduces cash holdings in EMU countries. Third, my results suggest 
that agency theory plays an important role in explaining corporate liquidity. In particular, 
the agency view explains corporate liquidity better for EMU firms, probably because of 
an enhanced capital market integration that weakens the transaction and precautionary 
motives of holding cash. Fourth, I show that dealing with the endogeneity problem in 
corporate liquidity studies is important. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) culminating in the 
adoption of the common currency, euro, is one of the most important economic events in 
recent years. This macro change apparently affects the foreign exchange markets, 
especially for those countries that adopted the euro. It might also have affected the asset 
structure of firms in the EMU countries. This dissertation consists of two chapters, each 
of which aims to examine the impacts of the monetary union on the member states from 
the perspective of international finance. More specifically, one chapter deals with the 
introduction of the euro and purchasing power parity (PPP) while the other chapter deals 
with the effects of corporate governance and monetary union on corporate liquidity. 
Methodologically, the first chapter is an application of time series econometrics, i.e., unit 
root test using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) (Zellner 1962).  The second 
chapter is an application of a dynamic panel data model (Arellano and Bond 1991). The 
following describes the history of European Union (EU) and how the EMU and euro 
came into being. After that, I provide a brief introduction for each of these two chapters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This dissertation follows the style and format of Journal of Financial Economics. 
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A. EU, EMU and Euro 
European countries have attempted to form a more united Europe for more than 50 years. 
Shortly after the Second World War, several treaties were signed with the intent of 
preventing wars and pursuing peace. The early treaties dealt with economic integration 
because the signatories believed that political conflicts and wars were less likely to 
happen if the countries shared common economic interests.  
The Treaty of Paris was signed in 1951 to set up European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), which consists of 6 countries, i.e., Belgium, West Germany, 
Luxembourg, France, Italy and the Netherlands. In 1957, these same countries signed the 
Treaty of Rome to set up the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European 
Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM). These 3 arrangements (i.e., ECSC, EEC and 
EURATOM) are considered the predecessor of the recently established European Union 
(EU). The motivation behind the establishment of these communities is to pursue higher 
degree of economic integration by removing trade barriers and creating a single market. 
Subsequently, in 1986, the Single European Act was signed. In 1992, the Treaty on 
European Union (also termed the Maastricht Treaty) was signed and the European Union 
(EU) came into being. The objective of all these treaties is to enhance political and 
economic integration among the member states (Leonard 2002). 
The creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the euro was the 
culmination of this lengthy economic and political process and considered by many 
scholars as the most significant institutional innovation to occur in international markets. 
In fact, the monetary reforms in Europe date back to March 1979, when the European 
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Monetary System (EMS) was established to foster monetary stabilization. However, the 
exchange rate regime adopted at that time proved to be inadequate and finally led to 
speculative currency attacks in 1992-1993. In light of a series of monetary crisis since 
the 1980s, the Maastricht Treaty was agreed to in December 1991 and was signed in 
February 1992 to further promote monetary stabilization and form the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU).1  
The Treaty of Maastricht specified a gradual adjustment process to a union with 
countries converging in monetary and fiscal policies to some desired level. More 
specifically, according to the Maastricht Treaty, countries wishing to join the EMU have 
to meet four convergence criteria related to inflation, budget deficits, exchange rates and 
interest rates. The objective of the convergence criteria is to ensure harmonization in 
economic and monetary policies among potential member states. Inflation, budget 
deficits and interest rates had to be lowered to a desired level while exchange rates had 
to be stabilized. In 1998, 11 countries meeting the criteria fixed their bilateral foreign 
exchange rates against the Deutsche Mark. Ultimately, in January 1999, the same 11 
countries that met the convergence criteria formed the EMU and adopted a common 
currency, the euro. Greece was close to accession when the euro was launched, but it did 
not become a member state until January 1, 2001. On January 1 2002, the euro started to 
                                                 
 
1 According to the glossary provided by http://europa.eu.int, “Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is 
the name given to the process of harmonizing the economic and monetary policies of the member states of 
the Union with a view to introduce a single currency, the euro.” In this chapter, in addition to the above 
definition, EMU also means the union of 12 countries, depending on the context. 
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circulate and became the sole legal tender of the 12 EMU countries after February 28, 
2002.2 
In June 1997, the stability and growth pact was adopted by the European Council 
in Amsterdam as a resolution to ensure that the EMU countries continue to maintain 
desirable budget deficits. In fact, some countries like Germany and France have been 
issued warnings of excessive budget deficits. According to the stability and growth pact, 
countries running excessive budget deficits will be penalized such that fiscal policies of 
all member countries can remain as harmonized as before they became member states. In 
addition, a further resolution was also adopted by the European Council in Luxembourg 
in December 1997, which deals with the decision that ministers of the EMU countries 
may meet informally to coordinate their various policies related to the common currency, 
implying that participating countries may harmonize policies other than monetary and 
fiscal policies to achieve the goal of creating a common currency area. Hence, the euro is 
in a sense a catalyst, which helps expedite the market integration process. Subsequently, 
the Treaty of Amsterdam was signed in October 1997 and went into force on May 1, 
1999. The Treaty of Nice was signed in February 2001 and entered into force on 
February 1, 2003. These two treaties are more politically oriented, aimed to enhance 
cooperation between member states. Overall, the more recent treaties and resolutions 
also help integrate markets in the EU and the EMU. 
 
                                                 
 
2 For information about the fixed bilateral foreign exchange rates of the 12 EMU countries against the 
Deutsche Mark, please visit 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l25017.htm;http://www.portugal.org/information/economic4/info_
1l.html 
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B.  Euro and Purchasing Power Parity  
Chapter II studies euro and purchasing power parity (PPP). The Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) between 12 European countries and the adoption of a new common 
currency, the euro, has been accompanied by convergence in monetary and fiscal 
policies, increased transparency, as well as reduced barriers in the financial and real 
sectors of the participating countries.  
Purchasing power parity is a fundamental building block of international finance, 
linking prices and foreign exchange rates. It has been viewed as an equilibrium condition, 
an efficient arbitrage condition in goods or assets markets, and a theory of exchange rate 
determination.3 PPP plays a crucial role in risk management since it implies that nominal 
price fluctuations in the real sector are buffered (and if PPP holds, offset) by exchange 
rate fluctuations to maintain same real prices across countries. Therefore, its validity has 
been a subject of significant empirical scrutiny that has yielded mixed results. The 
prevailing consensus in the literature seems to be that estimated deviations from PPP are 
persistent with a half-life of 4 to 5 years.4  This chapter revisits PPP in the backdrop of 
the EMU and the euro adoption. Since the exchange rate fluctuations are precluded by 
having a common currency, the burden of maintaining PPP (or the law of one price) falls 
solely on harmonized inflation rates within the euro currency bloc countries.  
                                                 
 
3 See Officer (1976), Frenkel (1976, 1978), Dornbusch (1987), Isard (1987), and Summers and Heston 
(1991). 
4 See Froot and Rogoff (1995) and Rogoff (1996) for a survey of this literature. 
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 Chapter II has two objectives. The first is to provide further evidence on the 
validity of the PPP using an improved empirical procedure. The second is to compare 
PPP performance during three different exchange rate regimes, i.e., floating-rate, target-
zone arrangement, and fixed-rate or common currency regimes. More specifically, I 
examine whether the EMU and the adoption of the euro have improved PPP 
performance in the euro area. There is virtual consensus on the historic significance of 
the EMU and the euro. However, while skeptics have questioned the wisdom underlying 
this economic event, others believe that the changes associated with it will result in 
beneficial market integration (e.g., Mundell 1997).5 The significant effort to integrate 
EMU country markets by dismantling barriers and harmonizing regulations should lead 
to PPP holding better within the member states.  No improvement in PPP performance 
due to these remarkable changes will highlight the critical role that floating exchange 
rates play for the parity condition to hold across countries. Hence, my results will also 
have implications for the 10 countries that recently joined the European Union (EU) on 
May 1, 2004 and those aspiring to join it.6  
                                                 
 
5 For example, some economists thought that it would be better for Europe to have four or five regional 
currencies instead of a single currency (Tootell 1990; Krugman 1990). In addition, while some advocate 
that the euro adoption will further improve political integration in Europe despite economic problems 
which existed before the euro, Feldstein (1992; 1997; 2000) argued that this economic event may actually 
result in a political conflict within the EMU as well as with US. 
6 Greece’s experience is especially important because it did not join the EMU until 2001. It is predicted 
that the potential economic benefits for Greece from joining the EMU are large (perhaps up to 20% of 
GDP) (Vittas 2004). In fact, my study shows that Greece is one of the few countries where PPP holds after 
the introduction of the euro.  During my test period, EU was comprised of 15 countries. Eleven of these 
which joined the EMU on January 1, 1999 are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.  Greece was admitted to the EMU on January 1, 2001.  
Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom are members of EU but not EMU. 
  
7
 I investigate PPP during the period January 1973 to January 2004, which is 
further divided into three sub-periods based on different exchange rate regimes, i.e., 
floating exchange rate regime (January 1973 to March 1979), the European Monetary 
System (EMS) or target-zone arrangement regime (April 1979 to April 1998), and euro 
or fixed-rate regime (May 1998 to January 2004). Using seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) procedure and accounting for cross-currency correlations, I evaluate the parity 
condition using data from the twelve EMU countries and five non-EMU countries, 
including two EU countries in close geographic proximity to the euro area, i.e., United 
Kingdom (UK, which met the convergence criteria before 1999 but chose not to join the 
EMU) and Switzerland, as well three non-EU countries like the United States (US), 
Canada and Japan. I evaluate the parity between the currency blocs and within the euro 
currency bloc using the US dollar (USD) and the German Deutsche Mark (DM) as 
numeraire currencies.  
 
C.  Effects of Corporate Governance and Monetary Union on Corporate Liquidity 
Chapter III studies the effects of corporate governance and monetary union on corporate 
liquidity (or cash holdings of firms). Most finance literature dealing with the balance 
sheet studies the capital structure. Comparatively speaking, the asset structure has 
received little attention. This chapter examines corporate cash holdings, which is a less 
explored area in corporate finance. In addition, to my knowledge, this chapter is the first 
study of corporate liquidity using the monetary union as the backdrop and the first to 
examine the potential impacts of this macro change on the firm level cash holdings. 
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 In general, firms hold cash for transaction, precautionary and speculative 
motives.7 More specifically, they use cash to conduct day-to-day operations such as 
paying employees, purchasing inputs, and paying dividends to stockholders. Firms will 
hold less cash if the transaction cost (e.g., cost of liquidating assets or raising capital) is 
lower and vice versa. In addition, they hold cash for the precautionary reason to invest in 
future profitable projects in case they have difficulty raising funds from the capital 
markets. The precautionary motive results from information asymmetry and the agency 
costs of debt (Opler et al. 1999), both of which can make it difficult to raise funds in 
capital markets. Information asymmetry arises because outsiders know less about the 
firm’s operation than management, while the agency costs of debt arise when the 
interests of the debt holders differ from those of the shareholders. The higher the level of 
information asymmetry and the agency costs of debt, the greater will be the 
precautionary motive. Further, management might hoard cash because of its own 
personal risk aversion or because it wants to satisfy its own needs, e.g., consuming 
perquisites, termed the agency cost of managerial discretion (Opler et al. 1999).8  
Chapter III contributes to the existing international corporate liquidity literature 
in several ways. Many valuation models treat cash as negative debt; the amount of cash 
held by the firm is simply subtracted from the value of debt outstanding in order to 
compute shareholders’ equity in the firm (Acharya et al. 2005). This assumes perfect 
                                                 
 
7 Firms need cash for the speculative motive to take advantage of bargain purchases, but conventional 
wisdom is that liquidity held for speculative motive is relatively minor and negligible compared to that 
held due to transaction and precautionary motives.  
8 Agency costs also include costs incurred to minimize or eliminate the conflict between debt holders and 
equity holders or among different kinds of debt holders. 
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substitutability between cash and debt. On the other hand, no one assumes perfect 
substitutability between cash and equity.  While the relationship between cash and debt 
may not be perfect, cash is much closer to debt than it is to equity.9 Therefore, creditor 
rights should influence the cash holdings of firms more than shareholder rights. Recent 
international corporate liquidity studies have highlighted the importance of shareholder 
rights in a country as a determinant of its firms’ cash holdings (Dittmar et al. 2003), but 
no one has evaluated the role of creditor rights. The first contribution of Chapter III is to 
show that creditor rights are a significant determinant of corporate liquidity. 
 The creation of the European Union (EU) comprised of 15 countries, and within 
it, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of 12 countries, adopted a common 
currency. The creation of the EMU provides a unique opportunity to examine what 
happens to cash holdings of firms operating in an area where transactions which 
formally occurred in multiple currencies are reduced due to the single currency. 
Establishment of EMU and the common currency should lead to decreased transaction 
costs in the EMU countries. If capital markets become more integrated within the EMU, 
it should be easier for firms in EMU countries to raise funds and will thus weaken the 
precautionary motive for holding cash. This should result in lower corporate liquidity in 
EMU countries in contrast to non-EMU countries that retained their national currencies. 
The test of this hypothesis is the second contribution of this chapter, and to my 
knowledge, the first examination of this issue. I also investigate how the institutional 
                                                 
 
9 Opler et al.(1999) note that most of the variables associated with high cash levels are also known to be 
associated with low leverage. 
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changes associated with the EMU have affected the sensitivity of corporate liquidity to 
its benchmark determinants (e.g., market-to-book ratio, net working capital, cash flow, 
etc.). 
Finally, Chapter III formally deals with the endogeneity problem associated with 
the determinants of corporate liquidity that has received little attention in the liquidity 
literature. While recent studies have started recognizing this problem, they do not 
account for it.10 Since ignoring the presence of the endogeneity problem can lead to 
biased estimation, my study explicitly deals with this issue and shows that it is important 
to control for endogenous variables. Furthermore, since the agency costs are embedded 
in each of the extant theories (i.e., tradeoff theory, financing hierarchy theory, and 
agency theory), the predictions of each theory about how corporate liquidity is affected 
by its determinants are inevitably intertwined. It is difficult to infer which theory 
outperforms others from the estimated coefficients of the corporate liquidity 
determinants. Instead of arguing which theory best explains corporate liquidity, this 
chapter evaluates the relevance of agency theory in explaining corporate liquidity. I 
examine the coefficients of the corporate governance variables, whose effects are more 
clearly predicted by the agency theory.  
My data span 1993 to 2002. I analyze all 15 European Union (EU) countries, 
including 12 EMU countries with the euro as their common currency, and 3 non-EMU 
                                                 
 
10 For example, Harford et al. (2005) note that corporate cash holdings and corporate governance can be 
jointly determined, recognizing that the endogeneity problem may arise when modeling the relation 
between these two variables. However, they also note the difficulty in accounting for the endogeneity 
problem using two-stage least squares (2SLS) because of lack of proper instrument variables. Though they 
recognize it, yet they do not account for it in their study. 
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countries which have retained their numeraires, as a control group.11 Many changes 
resulting from the formation of the EU were common to all 15 member states. Therefore, 
selecting the 3 non-EMU country firms as the control group isolates the unique effect of 
the monetary union resulting in the adoption of a common currency on corporate 
liquidity in the 12 EMU countries. Using the dynamic panel data model (Arellano and 
Bond 1991) and accounting for the endogeneity problem associated with the 
determinants of corporate liquidity, I examine corporate cash holdings using a large 
sample of non-US firms. In particular, I investigate how corporate governance variables 
and monetary union affect corporate liquidity.  
                                                 
 
11 The 12 EMU countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The 3 non-EMU countries are Denmark, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom (UK). The EU admitted 10 new countries to the Union on May 1, 2004 and these are not 
included in my analysis.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
EURO AND PURCHASING POWER PARITY 
 
This chapter examines the validity of the purchasing power parity (PPP) condition during 
three distinct exchange rate regimes (floating-rate, target-zone arrangement, and fixed-
rate or common currency) from January 1973 through January 2004. Regulatory 
harmonization and real and financial sector changes associated with the adoption of euro 
as a common currency were supposed to enhance economic convergence and market 
integration in the euro zone. If they did, then PPP based on the law of one price should 
hold better. On the other hand, a single currency substitutes fixed for floating exchange 
rates, an important variable for restoring PPP, leaving the adjustment burden solely on 
domestic prices.  
My results support PPP but I find that PPP during the common currency 
regime holds in fewer EMU countries than during alternative exchange rate regimes. In 
addition, PPP between currency blocs holds for all countries examined during the first 
two regimes but deteriorates after the introduction of the euro for the EMU countries as 
opposed to the non-EMU countries. I do not obtain strong evidence supporting PPP for 
the EMU countries since the euro adoption, but faster mean reversion observed in the few 
EMU countries where PPP does hold may signal higher market efficiency and economic 
integration in the future. 
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A. Introduction 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) between 12 European countries and the adoption 
of a new common currency, euro, is one of the most significant recent institutional 
innovations in international markets. The adoption of euro is accompanied by 
convergence in monetary and fiscal policies, increased transparency, as well as removal 
of barriers in the financial and real sectors of the euro area countries. Purchasing power 
parity (PPP) is a fundamental building block of international finance, linking prices and 
foreign exchange rates. It has been viewed as an equilibrium condition, an efficient 
arbitrage condition in goods or assets markets, and a theory of exchange rate 
determination. 12  PPP plays a crucial role in risk management since it implies that 
nominal price fluctuations in the real sector are buffered (and if PPP holds, offset) by 
exchange rate fluctuations to maintain same real prices across countries. Therefore, its 
validity has been a subject of significant empirical scrutiny that has yielded mixed 
results. The prevailing consensus in the literature seems to be that estimated deviations 
from PPP are persistent with a half-life of 4 to 5 years.13  This chapter revisits PPP in the 
backdrop of EMU and euro adoption. Since the exchange rate fluctuations are precluded 
by having a common currency, the burden of maintaining PPP (or the law of one price) 
falls solely on harmonized inflation rates within the euro currency bloc countries. 
                                                 
 
12 See Officer (1976), Frenkel (1976, 1978), Dornbusch (1987), Isard (1987), and Summers and Heston 
(1991). 
13 See Froot and Rogoff (1995) and Rogoff (1996) for a survey of this literature. 
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This chapter has two objectives. The first is to provide further evidence on the 
validity of the PPP using a better empirical procedure. The second is to compare PPP 
performance during three different exchange rate regimes (floating-rate, target-zone 
arrangement, and fixed-rate or common currency). More specifically, I examine whether 
the EMU and the adoption of the euro have improved PPP performance in the euro area. 
There is virtual consensus on the historic significance of the EMU and euro. However, 
while skeptics have questioned the wisdom underlying this economic event, others 
believe that the changes associated with it will result in beneficial market integration 
(e.g., Mundell 1997). 14 The significant effort to integrate EMU country markets by 
dismantling barriers and harmonizing regulations should lead to PPP holding better 
within the EMU.  No improvement in PPP performance due to these remarkable changes 
will highlight the critical role floating exchange rates play for parity to hold across 
countries. Hence, my results will also have implications for the 10 countries that recently 
joined the European Union (EU) on May 1, 2004 and those aspiring to join it.15 
I test PPP during the period January 1973 to January 2004 further divided into 
three sub-periods based on different exchange rate regimes, i.e., floating exchange rate 
                                                 
 
14 For example, some economists thought that it would be better for Europe to have four or five regional 
currencies instead of a single currency (Tootell 1990; Krugman 1990). In addition, while some advocate 
that the euro adoption will further improve political integration in Europe despite economic problems 
which existed before the euro, Feldstein (1992; 1997; 2000) argued that this economic event may actually 
result in a political conflict within the EMU as well as with US. 
15 Greece’s experience is especially important because it did not join the EMU until 2001. It is predicted 
that the potential economic benefits for Greece from joining the EMU are large (perhaps up to 20% of 
GDP) (Vittas 2004). In fact, my study shows that Greece is one of the few countries where PPP holds after 
the introduction of the euro.  During my test period, EU was comprised of 15 countries. Eleven of these 
which joined the EMU on January 1, 1999 are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.  Greece was admitted to the EMU on January 1, 2001.  
Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom are members of EU but not EMU. 
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regime (January 1973 to March 1979), the European Monetary System (EMS) or target-
zone arrangement regime (April 1979 to April 1998), and euro or fixed-rate regime 
(May 1998 to January 2004). Using seemingly unrelated regression procedure and 
accounting for cross-currency correlations, I evaluate the parity using data from the 
twelve EMU countries, two non-EMU countries in close geographic proximity to the 
euro area, i.e., United Kingdom (UK, which is a member of the European Union) and 
Switzerland, as well as the United States (US), Canada, and Japan. I evaluate the parity 
between the currency blocs and within the euro currency bloc using the US dollar (USD) 
and the German Deutsche Mark (DM) as numeraire currencies. In general, I provide 
stronger evidence on the validity of the PPP against USD with significantly shorter half-
life than that documented in previous studies. Significantly, however, I do not obtain 
evidence of PPP holding better (i.e., domestic prices converging) within the rationale the 
EMU since the adoption of the euro. I observe PPP holding between currency blocs but 
not within a currency bloc, and reject geographic proximity between two countries as the 
rationale for PPP holding between them as argued by some researchers. 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section B provides a brief discussion of the 
EMU and euro. Section C discusses PPP and reviews the relevant literature. Section D 
discusses the model tested and the econometric issues associated with it. It also describes 
the data employed. Section E contains a discussion of my results and Section F 
concludes this chapter. 
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B.  EMU and Euro 
The euro came into being in 1999 at the end of a long convergence process that 
began in March 1979 with the establishment of the European Monetary System (EMS) 
designed to facilitate monetary stabilization. In 1992, after the EMS collapsed, European 
countries tried to restore monetary integration and signed the Maastricht Treaty, which 
specified a plan and the convergence criteria for the monetary union to occur in 1999. 
The adjustment process towards a union was to be gradual and countries had to 
dismantle barriers and converge in monetary and fiscal policies to an agreed upon level 
prior to forming a monetary union. Finally, countries that met the convergence criteria 
were formally admitted to the EMU on January 1, 1999 though their currencies’ 
exchange rates were fixed a few months earlier in May 1998. 
The adoption of a single currency was associated with many other reforms 
affecting both financial and real markets in the EMU. In addition to convergence in 
monetary and fiscal policies as well as reconciliation between national banks in the euro 
zone, trade policies and regulations dealing with cross-border flows were relaxed to 
facilitate the flow of capital, labor, and goods across countries in the euro area. These led 
Issing (2001) to claim that prices of tradable goods will converge and co-movement of 
price and output will become better in the EMU. Rogoff (2001) noted that goods markets 
are less integrated than we might think due to trade costs (including transport costs, tariff 
as well as differences in regulations and currencies), and adoption of a single currency is 
one way to reduce trade costs. If reforms associated with the euro are effective in 
harmonizing markets by reducing regulatory and structural barriers and transaction costs, 
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they should result in a more integrated market with the law of one price (same price for a 
basket of goods in two countries) prevailing.  
The collapse of the fixed exchange rate Bretton Woods system in 1971 leading to 
the floating exchange rate system resulted in a significant debate regarding the pros and 
cons of these regimes. The periodic discontent with the floating-rate regime, especially 
in periods of high inflation and widely fluctuating exchange rates, still prompts 
occasional calls for a return to the fixed-rate system. However, such calls are short lived 
because a fixed-rate or common currency regime entails governments surrendering a 
significant control over their monetary policy (to assure uniform price stability across all 
member nations) and governments may be reluctant or unable to do so. Hence, whether 
PPP and price convergence improve with reduced barriers but fixed exchange rates is an 
empirical issue and adoption of the euro provides a unique opportunity to test it. This 
provides the motivation for my study. I compare PPP performance during different 
exchange rate regimes, and in particular, I examine whether adoption of the euro results 
in price convergence with PPP holding better. The next section discusses empirical 
issues associated with testing the PPP. 
 
C. PPP: Empirical Issues and Literature Review 
1.   Purchasing Power Parity 
The PPP is based on the law of one price, which states that in the absence of any 
frictions, identical goods should trade for the same real price in different countries. If we 
  
18
construct a basket of similar goods in two countries, PPP specifies that the exchange rate 
for any two currencies should equal the relative own-currency price of the two baskets. 
Disparity from PPP ( )tid ,  can be expressed as: 
 ( ),1lnln ,
,
*
,,
, ti
ti
titi
ti kP
PS
d +=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=  (1)  
where S is the spot exchange rate in terms of base currency (USD or DM) per unit of 
foreign currency, P* is the foreign price level, P is the base country price level, k stands 
for some level of market imperfection or measurement errors, subscript i stands for 
country i and t is the time subscript.16  
Mixed empirical validity of PPP in previous studies has been attributed to a 
variety of reasons in the literature. Price levels are typically proxied by monthly price 
indices for consumer or wholesale goods. Since these indices contain a large fraction of 
non-tradable goods (both tradable and non-tradable goods can have country specific 
weights in the indices reflecting differing national tastes), their use can increase the 
probability of erroneously rejecting the PPP. 17  Besides, in practice, available price 
indices data do not have the same base year, which can lead to estimated 0, ≠tid . 
Researchers respond to this problem by either assuming PPP holding in the base period 
(e.g., Rogoff 1996) or by ignoring the intercept when performing estimation (e.g., Flôres 
                                                 
 
16 Note that for consistency, we continue to use DM (and USD) as the base currency for evaluating PPP 
during the third sub-period. Since the exchange rates of all EMU currencies are fixed against each other,  
Si,t  in equation 1during this period is a constant for EMU countries when using DM as the numeraire, but 
fluctuates when USD is the base currency (since euro fluctuates against USD).    
17 Tradable goods indices have other problems, are available for fewer countries, and have lower 
(quarterly) frequency data. 
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et al. 1999). Furthermore, td  can also be non-zero if PPP is actually violated due to 
existence of non-arbitragable imperfections.  
 
2. Literature Review 
The importance of PPP has resulted in a burgeoning body of empirical literature testing 
its validity.18 Recent studies test for the existence of unit root in the real exchange rate. 
Rejection of a unit root (random walk) implies existence of mean reversion of real 
exchange rate towards the parity condition. The more robust panel data approach or 
multivariate unit root test entails pooling data for different currencies.19 Imposing the 
condition of common speed of mean reversion for all currencies, Abuaf and Jorion 
(1990), Jorion and Sweeney (1996) and Frankel and Rose (1996) provide evidence 
against unit root. However, given differential regulations and nature of markets in 
different countries, their real exchange rates could display different speeds of adjustment 
and mean reversion. This could also be due to differential trading costs (e.g., Sercu et al. 
(1995)) as well as the nature of shocks, real or monetary, borne by an economy. For 
example, highly inflationary economies display faster mean reversion (see McNown and 
Wallace (1989)). In addition, slow productivity gains in Japanese nontradable goods due 
to government protection vis-à-vis competitive tradable goods resulting in sustained real 
                                                 
 
18 See Froot and Rogoff (1995) and Rogoff (1996) for studies that review this literature. 
19 Another technique called cointegration analysis, developed by Engle and Granger (1987), has also been 
applied to test PPP. It segregates the real exchange rate into its nominal and price-level components and 
tests the stationarity of the residuals. These tests suffer from problems of endogeneity of regressors, 
frequently obtain estimates of cointegration vector that are hard to interpret and by allowing for non-
proportional relationships, can not shed light on whether real exchange rates are mean-reverting. 
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appreciation of yen led to very slow mean reversion (see Marston (1987) and Yoshikawa 
(1990)). That is also the case when relative prices adjusted for exchange rates are 
correlated with relative productivity of economies (see Balassa (1964) and Canzoneri et 
al. (1999)). Thus, the speed of mean reversion depends on the unique nature of a shock 
and the way it affects a currency, which is ignored by studies assuming a common speed 
of adjustment. My panel data approach allows for this.  
Furthermore, it is well known that in today’s interrelated markets, a shock in one 
country can have repercussions in other countries (e.g., the 1997 Asian currency crises). 
This can result in non-zero correlations and cross-sectional dependence across currencies. 
Recent studies that econometrically account for such dependence increase the power of 
their tests.20 Tests conducted in this chapter account for cross sectional dependence 
among currencies and allow for differential speeds of mean reversion. 
This chapter sheds light on another issue, i.e., how well the PPP holds within a 
currency bloc in contrast to between currency blocs. I separately examine how well PPP 
performs in the 12 EMU and 5 non-EMU countries with both USD and DM as the 
numeraire.  Evidence on this issue is sparse and seems to suggest that PPP holds better 
within the currency blocs but not between them. Koedijk et al. (1998) conjecture that 
lower volatility of currencies and geographic proximity within the currency bloc 
contribute to more effective arbitrage and thus lead to evidence in favor of PPP within 
the bloc. This is supported by Eun and Lai (2003) who report that, with DM as the 
benchmark, PPP holds between Germany and other EMU countries but does not hold 
                                                 
 
20 See Koedijk et al. (1998) and Flôres et al. (1999). 
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between Germany and non-EMU countries that are proximate to the euro area, i.e., UK 
and Switzerland, from 1994 to 2001. The real exchange rates for these two countries 
behave like those of other non-EMU but geographically distant countries (like the US) 
suggesting that institutions may overwhelm geographic proximity regarding their effects 
on PPP. However, Koedijk et al. (2003) support PPP holding within the euro currency 
bloc for only 4 out of 9 countries they analyzed.21  Hence, existing evidence regarding 
PPP holding better within a currency bloc than between currency blocs is mixed and 
unreliable. 
I examine PPP between European countries that are geographically close to the 
euro zone but not members of the EMU (i.e., UK and Switzerland) as well as non-EMU 
countries which are geographically distant from the euro zone (i.e., US, Canada, and 
Japan), to see how geographic proximity affects PPP. 22 Using DM as numeraire, I find 
much weaker support for PPP holding between Germany and other EMU countries than 
between Germany and non-EMU countries, suggesting that PPP holds better between 
currency blocs rather than within a bloc. Geographic proximity plays no role for PPP to 
hold.  In general, my results support PPP but I find no evidence of PPP holding better 
within the EMU after the adoption of the common currency (fixed-rate) regime whether 
PPP is evaluated using USD or DM.   
                                                 
 
21 Their results are questionable. Koedijk et al. (2004) divide their test period (1975-2003) into 3 
overlapping sub-periods, each starting in March 1973 (March 1973 to December 1991, March 1973 to 
December 1998, and March 1973 to March 2003) to examine whether Maastricht Treaty and the euro 
improve PPP. However, this procedure of simply adding more observations by just extending the test 
period cannot shed light on the key issue of PPP performance during the euro period. We test for PPP over 
three distinct non-overlapping sub-periods so my results are not contaminated by data from other regimes. 
22 UK is a member of EU (that includes EMU countries), sharing common policies with EMU countries 
except that it has not adopted the common currency. 
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D.  Methodology Issues 
I use the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) or the multivariate unit root test as the 
estimation procedure in this chapter. It has more power than the univariate unit root 
test.23 Furthermore, SUR derived estimators are more efficient than those obtained from 
OLS (Zellner 1962) when real exchange rates across currencies are contemporaneously 
correlated as documented in some studies.24   
The model for the multivariate unit root test takes the form: 
 titiiiti udd ,1,, ++= −βα  (2) 
where tid , is PPP disparity as defined in equation (1). Each data series was stacked on 
each other to perform the SUR, which was conducted using EViews statistical package 
by including intercepts and allowing iterations to obtain convergence in weights and 
therefore feasible GLS estimators. 
As discussed earlier, many factors can lead to observation of PPP violations and 
non-zero αi in equation (2).25  Therefore, unlike previous studies, I allow for a non-zero 
intercept when performing the SUR. In general, my focus is to test whether βi is 
significantly less than one. My null hypothesis is that PPP disparity, tid , , follows random 
walk or 1.  : i =βoH  If the estimated iβ  is not significantly different from one, I conclude 
that real exchange rates follow random walk (are nonstationary) and are not mean 
                                                 
 
23 See Edison, et al (1997), and Papell and Theodoridis (1998). 
24 See, for example, O’Connell (1998) and Flôres et al. (1999). 
25 For example, different base years of price indices used and existence of frictions (a la Sercu et al. 
(1995), Devereux (1997)) can lead to PPP violations. 
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reverting, i.e., PPP does not hold. My alternative hypothesis is 1: <iaH β , which 
implies existence of mean reversion towards parity.26 The estimated speed of mean 
reversion towards PPP can be discerned from the half-life (i.e., ( ) ( )ln 0.5 / ln iβ ), which 
reveals how fast a shock will die out to restore PPP over time. More specifically, half-
life tells us how long it takes a shock to become half of its initial size. A short half-life 
implies that PPP is restored quickly and holds better as opposed to a long half-life.  
The critical values used to determine statistical significance of the results have to 
be derived by simulation analysis, taking into account the historical covariance matrix 
obtained from the estimation results. However, previous studies (Abuaf and Jorion 1990; 
Flôres et al. 1999) assume that the intercept is zero (i.e., 0=α ) for the true process when 
performing simulations. This procedure inappropriately assumes that PPP is holding in 
the base year, markets are devoid of frictions and uneven base years for price indices do 
not result in any measurement problems. If these assumptions are violated, observed 
disparity could converge to some level that may not be zero and I can still test for the 
existence of mean reversion towards that level. Therefore, forcing the intercept to be 
zero as done by previous studies is economically inappropriate. I conducted simulation 
analysis in Gauss assuming that the data were generated by equation (2) with 1=β  and 
without imposing the restriction of α  being zero (i.e., unit root model with drift). Hence, 
the assumed true model and the estimated model are the same. This is in contrast to 
                                                 
 
26 Under the mean reversion alternative hypothesis, the current real rate will revert to the long run 
equilibrium rate at the speed of ( ).i i β-l/α  Unless the long run rate is unity, αi must be non-zero.  Due to 
reasons mentioned earlier, the estimated long run disparity need not be zero, therefore, αi need not equal 
zero under Ha.   
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previous papers (Abuaf and Jorion 1990; Flôres et al. 1999) that assume random walk 
with drift for their estimation model but random walk without drift for simulation or 
their assumed true model. 
Since my interest is the mean reversion (i.e., β) and I do not really know if the 
intercept is zero, I can eliminate the constant by the Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL) 
theorem when conducting simulation and still get the same estimator for β (Baltagi 
2002). This is different from the Abuaf and Jorion (1990) approach, in which the 
sample’s estimate of the intercept is inappropriately used for simulation.  
Suppose the simulation model is as follows: 
 , , 1 ,i t i i t i td d uα −= + + . (3) 
Pre-multiplying each series { }, 1Ti t td =  in equation (1) by TIQ TTT
'ιι−= , I have 
 , , 1 ,i t i t i td d u−= +% % % , (4) 
where TI is an identity matrix with the dimension of TT × ; 
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Then data are generated according to the above transformed process. The values of 
{ }, 1Ti t tu =  ( )1i N= K are generated simultaneously by the random number generator with 
standard normal distribution. Pre-multiplying each series { }, 1Ti t tu =  by Q and 
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obtaining { }, 1Ti t tu =% , the random walk process ,i td%  is generated based on the following 
equation: 
 , ,
1
, 1 .
t
i t i t
s
d u t T
=
= = …∑% %  (5) 
The historical covariance matrices obtained from EViews were used to generate 
GLS estimators for the experiment. Then, the estimated coefficient is calculated based 
on the standard OLS formula, i.e., 
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where , ,1, , , and  is  adjusted for cross sectional correlation.i t i ti N d d=
) %K  The number of 
iterations is 5000. The coefficient iˆβ ’s were then derived and they are asymptotically 
distributed Gaussian (Hamilton 1994) since both the estimation model and the true 
model are characterized by the process of random walk with drift. It follows that the 
only relevant test statistic is t-test statistic, i.e.,  
 ( )
ˆ 1
ˆ
i
i
t
se
β
β
−= , (7) 
which was used to determine whether to reject the null hypothesis of random walk. The 
one-sided critical values were generated at 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels based on the 
empirical distribution of t-test statistics27. 
                                                 
 
27 Critical values obtained from my simulations are reported in Appendix A. 
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Ahn (1994) shows that ignoring known structural breaks can lead to incorrect 
inferences when performing tests of stationarity. Since I are interested in the validity of 
PPP during different exchange rate regimes, I separately analyze data over three sub-
periods: January 1973 to March 1979 (the floating exchange rate regime), April 1979 to 
April 1998 (the target-zone arrangement regime), and May 1998 to January 2004 (the 
fixed-rate euro regime). 28 
 In addition to evaluating PPP for each individual country within the euro area, I 
also want to assess the unique effect of the euro on price convergence in EMU countries 
as a group. I examine the whole data set from January 1973 to January 2004 as well as 
pre and post euro sub-periods for EMU and non-EMU countries. To examine this issue, I 
implement two other SUR setups. One allows for different country coefficients and the 
other imposes a common coefficient. For each setup, I have two models. One model has 
two time dummies to distinguish the three sub-periods. The other model has only one 
time dummy that distinguishes only the third (euro) sub-period from the rest. I want to 
see if the coefficients associated with the euro period time dummies ( )2D  are 
significantly different from zero (and if PPP holds better due to increased market 
integration, they should be significantly less than zero). The following are the 
specifications of the two models under each setup. 
                                                 
 
28 The European Council approved the entry of the 11 countries into the EMU on May 2, 1998. Bilateral 
exchange rates between 11 EMU countries were fixed on May 3, 1998 
(http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l25017.htm; 
http://www.portugal.org/information/economic4/info_1l.html). Since we test for PPP against DM, we 
chose May 1998 as the breaking point where the euro was implicitly introduced for the EMU countries 
instead of January 1999 when financial markets started operating in euro. For similar reasons, Bris (2003) 
also uses 1998 as the benchmark for the adoption of the euro. 
  
27
Different coefficient model: 
Model 1: titiitiitiiiti udDdDdd ,1,221,111,, +⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅+= −−− γγβα  
  Model 2: titiitiiiti udDdd ,1,21,, +⋅⋅+⋅+= −− γβα  
Common coefficient model: 
Model 1: tititititi udDdDdd ,1,221,111,, +⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅+= −−− γγβα  
Model 2: titititi udDdd ,1,21,, +⋅⋅+⋅+= −− γβα  
where 1D  is the time dummy variable which equals one for the second sub-period from 
April 1979 to April 1998 and zero otherwise; 2D is the time dummy which equals one 
for the third sub-period from May 1998 to January 2004 and 0 otherwise; other notations 
are the same as defined earlier. Again, I used EViews statistical package to conduct the 
estimation. For the different country coefficients model, I conducted SUR for the full 
sample of 16 countries as a whole. However, SUR was performed for 11 EMU countries 
and 5 non-EMU countries separately for the common coefficient model. My null 
hypothesis is 0γ  0γ:H i0 == ,  and my alternative hypothesis is 0γ  0γ:H ia ≠≠ , .  If I 
reject the null hypothesis and the estimated coefficient γ  associated with the second 
time dummy ( 2D ) is significantly less (greater) than zero (i.e., mean reversion is faster 
(slower) due to the introduction of euro), I will conclude that the adoption of the euro 
improves (worsens) PPP and price harmonization. In contrast, if I am unable to reject the 
null hypothesis, I will conclude that PPP performance has not been affected by the 
common currency. 
 
  
28
Table 1. System Autoregression against USD. titiiiti udd ,1,, ++= −βα , 
Monthly Data: January 1973 - January 2004 
tid ,  is disparity from PPP and defined as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
t
tt
ti P
PS
d
*
, log , where tS  denotes spot exchange rate in unit of USD per foreign currency; tP and 
*
tP are price levels (represented 
by CPIs) for US and some other country, respectively. 
 (A) 1973:1-1979:3 (B) 1979:4-1998:4 (C) 1998:5-2004:1 
Country βι (se(βι)) half-life  τ(βι) βι (se(βι)) half-life  τ(βι) βι (se(βι)) half-life  τ(βι) 
Austria 0.944 (0.013) 11.97 -4.20* 0.970 (0.004) 23.01 -6.73*** 0.980 (0.007) n.a. -2.89 
Belgium 0.944 (0.013) n.a. -4.36 0.970 (0.004) n.a. -6.86 0.982 (0.007) n.a. -2.43 
Finland 0.924 (0.020) 8.80 -3.86*** 0.965 (0.008) 19.32 -4.60*** 0.978 (0.007) n.a. -3.26 
France 0.946 (0.025) 12.59 -2.12** 0.970 (0.005) 22.83 -5.81*** 0.982 (0.007) n.a. -2.75 
Germany 0.925 (0.019) 8.89 -3.93* 0.968 (0.005) 21.48 -6.89*** 0.984 (0.008) n.a. -2.16 
Greece 0.893 (0.046) 6.10 -2.32*** 0.979 (0.009) 32.97 -2.31*** 0.952 (0.027) 14.05 -1.81*** 
Ireland 0.902 (0.042) 6.71 -2.36** 0.956 (0.008) 15.51 -5.31*** 0.971 (0.007) 23.27 -4.32*** 
Italy 0.872 (0.039) 5.07 -3.29*** 0.968 (0.007) 21.08 -4.88*** 0.983 (0.007) n.a. -2.37 
Luxembourg 0.939 (0.015) n.a. -4.13 0.969 (0.004) n.a. -6.82 0.981 (0.008) n.a. -2.28 
Netherlands 0.929 (0.017) 9.41 -4.12*** 0.948 (0.012) 12.93 -4.22*** 0.976 (0.008) 28.97 -3.03** 
Portugal 0.846 (0.044) 4.15 -3.48*** 0.985 (0.006) 45.55 -2.69*** 0.978 (0.008) 31.15 -2.73* 
Spain 0.954 (0.036) 14.79 -1.28** 0.975 (0.006) 27.80 -4.38*** 0.976 (0.007) 28.09 -3.33** 
Average half-life  8.85   24.25   25.10  
No. of countries where PPP is supported   10   10   5 
          
Canada 0.961 (0.032) n.a. -1.20 0.993 (0.010) n.a. -0.67 0.963 (0.038) n.a. -0.96 
Japan 0.947 (0.018) 12.75 -2.99*** 0.978 (0.008) 31.44 -2.79*** 0.946 (0.036) 12.59 -1.48** 
Switzerland 0.933 (0.020) 9.98 -3.41*** 0.966 (0.006) 20.10 -5.29*** 0.944 (0.013) 12.12 -4.18*** 
UK 0.936 (0.029) n.a. -2.19 0.974 (0.010) 26.14 -2.50*** 0.989 (0.028) n.a. -0.41 
Average half-life  11.36   25.89   12.36  
No. of countries where PPP is supported   2   3   2 
          
Overall average half-life  9.27   24.63   21.46  
Total no. of countries where PPP is supported   12   13   7 
Notes: Statistics are defined as ( ) ( )
1i
i
ise
βτ β β
−= . One-sided critical values of ( )iτ β are obtained from simulation under the null hypothesis that 1iβ =  without assuming 0iα = . 
Half-life (months) is calculated only for those countries associated with rejections by the formula: ( ) ( )ln 0.5 / ln iβ . Rejections of the null hypothesis at 10%, 5%, and 1% are 
represented by *, **, and ***, respectively. Data are obtained from International Financial Statistics and DataStream. 
  
29
I obtain end of month data on foreign exchange rates and consumer price indices 
from International Financial Statistics (IFS) and DataStream spanning 31 years and 1 
month from 1973 (start of the floating exchange rate regime) to 2004. These data are 
obtained for 17 countries, the 12 euro-zone countries and 5 countries outside the euro 
zone. Since I am also interested in evaluating PPP between and within currency blocs, I 
evaluate PPP using two different numeraire currencies. The between currency blocs tests 
are conducted with all foreign exchange rates measured in USD. To test PPP within the 
euro zone, all exchange rates are measured in DM.  
 
E. Empirical Results 
Tables 1 and 2 present the unit root test results for the PPP. The tables have three panels, 
each containing results for the three sub-periods associated with a distinct exchange rate 
regime. Panel A reports results for the floating-rate regime spanning January 1973 to 
March 1979, panel B for the target-zone arrangement EMS regime spanning April 1979 
to April 1998 and panel C for the fixed-rate euro regime covering May 1998 to January 
2004. Each table reports results obtained from the SUR analysis, i.e., the slope 
coefficients, their standard errors, the half-life, t-test statistic, and the significance of the 
slope coefficient ( )1β:H  1;β:H iai0 <= . I first discuss the results obtained with USD 
as the numeraire for 16 currencies (i.e., between currency blocs test) followed by the 
results with DM as the numeraire for 11 euroland countries (i.e., within currency bloc 
test) and five non-EMU countries which serve as a control group. 
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Table 2. System Autoregression against DM. titiiiti udd ,1,, ++= −βα , 
Monthly Data: January 1973 - January 2004 
tid ,  is disparity from PPP and defined as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
t
tt
ti P
PSd
*
, log , where tS  denotes spot exchange rate in unit of DM per foreign currency; tP and 
*
tP are price levels (represented by CPIs) 
for Germany and some other country, respectively. 
 (A) 1973:1-1979:3 (B) 1979:4-1998:4 (C) 1998:5-2004:1 
Country βι (se(βι)) half-life τ(βι) βι (se(βι)) half-life τ(βι) βι (se(βι)) half-life τ(βι) 
Austria 0.948 (0.017) n.a. -3.04 0.979 (0.008) n.a. -2.58 0.882 (0.034) n.a. -3.50 
Belgium 0.970 (0.016) n.a. -1.93 0.953 (0.011) n.a. -4.31 0.921 (0.032) n.a. -2.48 
Finland 0.956 (0.019) 15.40 -2.34* 0.974 (0.009) 26.75 -2.88*** 0.752 (0.043) 2.43 -5.73*** 
France 0.936 (0.033) 10.56 -1.93** 0.948 (0.016) 12.95 -3.21*** 0.967 (0.027) n.a. -1.23 
Greece 0.784 (0.044) 2.84 -4.86*** 0.924 (0.021) 8.75 -3.60*** 0.804 (0.049) 3.18 -4.01*** 
Ireland 0.841 (0.046) 4.01 -3.45*** 0.974 (0.011) 26.41 -2.34*** 0.979 (0.009) n.a. -2.43 
Italy 0.831 (0.034) 3.74 -4.91*** 0.977 (0.009) 30.33 -2.40*** 0.960 (0.014) n.a. -2.82 
Luxembourg 0.978 (0.022) n.a. -1.01 0.951 (0.011) n.a. -4.55 0.840 (0.044) 3.99 -3.66*** 
Netherlands 0.918 (0.027) 8.07 -3.01* 0.988 (0.012) 56.67 -1.05* 0.969 (0.017) n.a. -1.82 
Portugal 0.936 (0.033) 10.49 -1.94*** 0.996 (0.010) n.a. -0.43 0.963 (0.015) n.a. -2.54 
Spain 0.863 (0.048) 4.71 -2.85*** 0.974 (0.011) 26.53 -2.30*** 0.946 (0.015) 12.57 -3.59** 
Average half-life  7.48   26.91   5.54  
No. of  countries where PPP is supported   8   7   4 
          
Canada 0.939 (0.022) 10.99 -2.78* 0.988 (0.008) n.a. -1.59 0.925 (0.027) 8.85 -2.84*** 
Japan 0.972 (0.025) n.a. -1.12 0.987 (0.011) 52.32 -1.20*** 0.913 (0.028) 7.66 -3.09*** 
Switzerland 0.961 (0.027) n.a. -1.47 0.968 (0.017) 21.10 -1.91* 0.944 (0.029) n.a. -1.94 
UK 0.878 (0.035) 5.32 -3.48*** 0.951 (0.013) 13.79 -3.87*** 0.845 (0.039) 4.13 -3.97*** 
US 0.903 (0.026) 6.81 -3.74** 0.988 (0.008) n.a. -1.47 0.934 (0.021) 10.21 -3.12*** 
Average half-life  7.71   29.07   7.71  
No. of  countries where PPP is supported   3   3   4 
          
Overall average half-life  7.54   27.56   6.63  
Total no. of countries where PPP is supported   11   10   8 
Notes: Statistics are defined as ( ) ( )
1i
i
ise
βτ β β
−= . One-sided critical values of ( )iτ β are obtained from simulation under the null hypothesis that 1iβ =  without assuming 0iα = . Half-life 
(months) is calculated only for those countries associated with rejections by the formula: ( ) ( )ln 0.5 / ln iβ . Rejections of the null hypothesis at 10%, 5%, and 1% are represented by *, **, 
and ***, respectively. Data are obtained from International Financial Statistics and DataStream. 
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Table 3. System Autoregression with different coefficients against DM to examine the effect of euro adoption. 
Model 1: titiitiitiiiti udDdDdd ,1,221,111,, +⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅+= −−− γγβα ,  
Model 2: titiitiiiti udDdd ,1,21,, +⋅⋅+⋅+= −− γβα ,  
Monthly Data: January 1973 - January 2004 
tid ,  is disparity from PPP and defined as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
t
tt
ti P
PS
d
*
, log , where tS  denotes spot exchange rate in unit of DM per foreign currency; tP and 
*
tP are price levels (represented 
by CPIs) for Germany and some other country, respectively; 1D  is the time dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the time is from April 1979 to April 1998 and zero otherwise; 2D is 
the time dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the time is from May 1998 to January 2004 and 0 otherwise. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Country γι1  (se(γι1)) τ(γι1) γι2  (se(γι2)) τ(γι2) γ  (se(γ)) τ(γι) 
Austria -0.00142 (0.00056) -2.53 -0.00174 (0.00074) -2.34** -0.00010 (0.00043) -0.23 
Belgium 0.00096 (0.00036) 2.65** 0.00080 (0.00045) 1.76 0.00003 (0.00036) 0.09 
Finland -0.00280 (0.00240) -1.17 0.00080 (0.00284) 0.28 0.00283 (0.00234) 1.21 
France -0.00190 (0.00139) -1.37 -0.00079 (0.00164) -0.48 0.00057 (0.00132) 0.43 
Greece -0.00119 (0.00066) -1.81 -0.00297 (0.00097) -3.05*** -0.00192 (0.00076) -2.53** 
Ireland 0.02200 (0.00653) 3.37*** 0.02403 (0.00716) 3.36*** 0.00301 (0.00349) 0.86 
Italy -0.00146 (0.00044) -3.34*** -0.00137 (0.00053) -2.60** -0.00018 (0.00040) -0.45 
Luxembourg 0.00116 (0.00042) 2.74** 0.00086 (0.00051) 1.68 -0.00009 (0.00038) -0.25 
Netherlands 0.02332 (0.02270) 1.03 0.00435 (0.03676) 0.12 -0.00913 (0.03384) -0.27 
Portugal -0.00081 (0.00060) -1.34 -0.00126 (0.00090) -1.40 -0.00055 (0.00073) -0.76 
Spain -0.00088 (0.00084) -1.06 -0.00117 (0.00101) -1.16 -0.00048 (0.00070) -0.68 
Canada 0.01409 (0.01089) 1.29 0.00347 (0.01588) 0.22 -0.00699 (0.01359) -0.51 
Japan -0.00131 (0.00115) -1.14 -0.00197 (0.00161) -1.22 -0.00078 (0.00108) -0.72 
Switzerland 0.01273 (0.02533) 0.50 0.02024 (0.02431) 0.83 0.01012 (0.01181) 0.86 
UK 0.02019 (0.00543) 3.72*** 0.02676 (0.00674) 3.97*** 0.00486 (0.00338) 1.44 
US 0.01652 (0.00892) 1.85 0.01454 (0.01002) 1.45 -0.00065 (0.00589) -0.11 
Notes: Statistics are defined as 
)(
)( γ
γγτ
se
= . Rejections of the null hypothesis at 10%, 5%, and 1% are represented by *, **, and ***, respectively. Data are obtained from 
International Financial Statistics and DataStream.
  
32
Table 4. System Autoregression with common coefficient against DM to examine the effect of euro adoption. 
Model 1: tititititi udDdDdd ,1,221,111,, +⋅⋅+⋅⋅+⋅+= −−− γγβα , 
Model 2: titititi udDdd ,1,21,, +⋅⋅+⋅+= −− γβα , 
Monthly Data: January 1973 - January 2004 
tid ,  is disparity from PPP and defined as ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
t
tt
ti P
PS
d
*
, log , where tS  denotes spot exchange rate in unit of DM per foreign currency; tP and 
*
tP are price levels (represented by CPIs) for Germany and some other country, respectively;  1D  is the time dummy which takes on the value of 1 if 
the time is from April 1979 to April 1998 and zero otherwise; 2D is the time dummy which takes on the value of 1 if the time is from May 1998 to 
January 2004  and 0 otherwise. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Group γ1  (se(γ1)) τ(γ1) γ2  (se(γ2)) τ(γ2) γ  (se(γ)) τ(γ) 
11 EMU countries -0.00004 (0.00020) -0.19 -0.00002 (0.00025) -0.06 0.00001 (0.00020) 0.06 
5 non-EMU countries 0.00059 (0.00073) 0.80 0.00035 (0.00093) 0.38 -0.00009 (0.00075) -0.12 
  
Notes: Statistics are defined as 
)(
)( γ
γγτ
se
= . Rejections of the null hypothesis at 10%, 5%, and 1% are represented by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
Data are obtained from International Financial Statistics and DataStream. 
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Following this, I discuss structural break results obtained from the SUR 
including time dummy variables to see if euro adoption affects PPP performance (or 
more specifically, mean reversion) in the euro area. I also examine what happens to PPP 
for countries outside the euro area to provide a contrast. These results are contained in 
Tables 3 and 4, which show the significance of coefficients associated with the dummy 
variables ( )0:H  0;:H a0 ≠γ=γ . Table 3 presents results from SUR allowing for 
different country coefficients while Table 4 contains results from SUR imposing the 
restriction of common coefficients. Time paths for the relevant variables are presented in 
Figures 1 and 2 to visually understand my findings.  
 
1. Unit Root Test Results 
Table 1 contains PPP results for 16 countries using USD as the benchmark currency.  In 
the first sub-period (floating-rate regime), panel A shows that the null of random walk 
( )1=iβ  cannot be rejected for only 4 of the 16 countries at the 10% level, which are 
Belgium, Luxembourg, Canada and UK. Evidence supporting mean reversion towards 
PPP (βi < 1) is obtained for 12 countries (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland) during this sub-
period. Panel B results for the second sub-period (target-zone arrangement regime) show 
an increase in the number of rejections and an even stronger support (at 1% level) for 
PPP. Mean reversion is supported in this sub-period for one more country (i.e., UK) 
compared to the first sub-period. Panel C results for the third sub-period (fixed-rate euro
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Figure 1. Time path for Greek Drachma against DM. 
Monthly Data: January 1973 - January 2004 
Time-series plot of monthly data of disparity from PPP ( td ), price ratio ( )tt PP* , and 
nominal exchange rate ( tS ) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Time path for Irish Pound against DM. 
Monthly Data: January 1973 - January 2004 
Time-series plot of monthly data of disparity from PPP ( td ), price ratio ( )tt PP* , and 
nominal exchange rate ( tS ) 
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regime) show βi < 1 at 10% significance level in only 5 EMU countries (i.e., Greece, 
Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and 2 non-EMU countries (i.e., Japan and 
Switzerland). PPP is not supported for 7 EMU countries and 2 non-EMU countries in 
this sub-period. The above results provide strong support for the PPP evaluated with 
USD as the numeraire before the adoption of the euro. PPP performance worsens after 
implementation of reforms and the introduction of the euro, being violated in a majority 
of the countries adopting the common currency. 
Even more telling are the half-life results (calculated only when the null 
hypothesis is rejected, i.e., mean reversion exists) reported in Table 1. The table reports 
half-life results for each country and for each of the three sub-periods. I also report the 
average half-life for the 12 EMU countries and 4 non-EMU countries as well as the 
overall average half-life over all 16 countries for each sub-period. For the EMU 
countries, I obtain the average half-life of 8.85, 24.25, and 25.10 months for sub-periods 
1, 2 and 3, respectively. For the non-EMU countries, the average half-life is 11.36, 
25.89, and 12.36 months for sub-periods 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Focusing on the EMU 
countries, the half-life appears to be the shortest during the first sub-period (floating-rate 
regime) and the longest during the third sub-period (fixed-rate euro regime). Overall, the 
average half-life across all countries is 9.27, 24.63, and 21.46 months for the three sub-
periods. In contrast to the half-life estimates of four to five years obtained by previous 
research, my results suggest that the rate at which PPP deviations dampen out is much 
faster than commonly believed. Half of the disparity disappears in about two years and 
with floating exchange rates, it takes less than a year. 
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Table 2 shows the regression results for the disparity from PPP using DM as the 
base currency. For the results within the euro area, the null hypothesis of random walk 
cannot be rejected for 3 of the 11 countries (Austria, Belgium, and Luxembourg) during 
the first sub-period (floating-rate regime). Mean reversion to PPP is supported for the 
other 8 EMU countries. Half-lives range from only 3 months to 15 months with an 
average half-life of 7.48 months. In contrast, the random walk hypothesis cannot be 
rejected for two (Japan and Switzerland) of the five non-EMU countries and PPP is 
supported for Canada, UK, and US during the first sub-period. The half-life ranges from 
5 to 11 months with an average half-life of 7.71 months for the non-EMU group. 
During the second sub-period with the target-zone arrangement regime, 7 of the 
11 EMU countries within the euro area display mean reversion (Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain). As in Table 1, half-lives for this sub-period 
are longer than during the first sub-period, ranging from 9 to over 57 months with an 
average half-life of 26.91 months. In contrast, I again reject the null hypothesis for 3 of 
the 5 non-EMU countries. The half-lives range from 14 to 52 months with an average 
half-life of 29.07 months. 
 During the third sub-period (fixed-rate euro regime), which is the focus of this 
chapter, random walk hypothesis is rejected for only 4 of the 11 EMU countries (3 at the 
1% level and 1 at the 5% level). These are the relatively smaller economies in the EMU 
(Finland, Greece, Luxembourg, and Spain). Mean reversion towards PPP (i.e., price 
convergence) is not supported for 7 of the 11 countries in the euro area, including 
Austria, Belgium, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, and Portugal. These results are in 
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contrast to the results for the second sub-period during which twice as many countries 
exhibited statistically significant results at 1% level. While the coefficients for the third 
sub-period are generally lower than for the second sub-period, I fail to reject the null 
hypothesis for many more countries during this sub-period. The main reason is the 
higher standard error resulting from large divergence in EMU countries’ domestic price 
levels without the benefit of any exchange rate fluctuations to offset them during this 
(fixed-rate euro regime) sub-period. The average half-life is only 5.54 months for the 
four countries displaying mean reversion. In contrast, I have 4 out of 5 rejections for the 
non-EMU control group during the third sub-period as opposed to 3 rejections during the 
second sub-period. The null hypothesis is strongly rejected for Canada, Japan, the UK 
and the US at the 1% level. Switzerland is the only exception for which PPP is not 
supported.29 The half-life ranges from 4 to 10 months with an average half-life of 7.71 
months.30 
Even though the number of rejections for the third sub-period within the euro 
area is lower than for the second sub-period, the half-lives for these countries during the 
third sub-period are shorter than during the earlier two sub-periods. Only four countries 
show evidence in support of PPP (i.e., mean reversion) while the vast majority, though 
                                                 
 
29 From my estimation results with DM as the base currency, we observe that between non-EMU European 
countries, PPP holds for the UK while we obtain little evidence in support of PPP for Switzerland.  The 
fact that UK is a member of the EU while Switzerland is not may explain the observation, recalling that 
UK has retained the freely floating pound sterling as its currency. 
30 Though my methodology is robust in sample size, one could be concerned that the 69 monthly 
observations for each country during the third sub-period may be influencing the observed lack of support 
for the PPP for the euro area countries. The reported 4 out of 5 rejections of the null hypothesis at 1% level 
for the control group during this sub-period should alleviate such concerns. In addition, the first sub-period 
has about the same number of monthly observations (72), but we are still able to reject the null hypothesis 
for twice as many countries (8 versus 4 for the third sub-period).  
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adjusting to a new regime, fail to demonstrate harmonized real sector prices and mean 
reversion. The average half-life is 7.48, 26.91, and 5.54 months for the EMU countries 
and 7.71, 29.07, and 7.71 months for the non-EMU countries during sub-periods 1, 2 and 
3, respectively. Overall, the average half-life over the 3 sub-periods for the 16 countries 
analyzed is 7.54, 27.56, and 6.63 months. 
In general, half-lives peak during the second sub-period whether using DM or 
USD as the base currency.31 While significantly shorter than those reported in previous 
studies, the longer half-life estimates for the second sub-period (4/1979 – 4/1998) can be 
attributed to two reasons32.  First, the USD experienced high fluctuation during the 
second sub-period, rising in 1980-1985 and sinking in 1985-1987. Second, the target-
zone exchange rate regime of the European Monetary System prevailing during this sub-
period may have constrained nominal exchange rate changes to fully offset fluctuations 
in relative prices. In the third sub-period with fixed exchange rates within the euro area, I 
observe PPP to deteriorate in the EMU countries (in terms of the number of countries for 
which the null cannot be rejected) using DM or USD. This suggests that the adoption of 
the euro has consequences for PPP both within the euro area as well as between EMU 
countries and the US. It is also worth noting that for those EMU countries in which PPP 
is supported during the third sub-period, the average half-life is shorter when evaluated 
using DM than USD. This suggests faster price harmonization within the currency bloc 
                                                 
 
31 The only exception is the results for the EMU countries with USD as the base currency where the 
average half-lives for the second and third sub-periods are very similar. 
32 My average half-life estimates are shorter than those reported in past research. This could be due to a 
more robust methodology. In addition, note that we do not include β’s which are not significantly different 
from one in calculating the average half-life. Including these (β=1, i.e., random walk) to estimate speed of 
mean reversion, as done by previous studies, makes no economic sense. 
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(the euro area) as opposed to between currency blocs (the euro area and the US) but only 
when PPP holds. 
Note that with DM as the numeraire, I are not able to reject the unit root 
hypothesis at the 5% level during the first two sub-periods for the Benelux countries 
(consisting of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg), which were currency 
partners of Germany during the first sub-period.33 In addition, PPP does not hold for 
Austria, which along with the Benelux countries has long been closely linked to the 
German economy. These results contradict the findings of Bayomi and Eichengreen 
(1997) which suggested that Austria, the Benelux countries and Germany (along with 
Ireland and Switzerland) were the best candidates for an optimum currency area in 
Europe. Taken together, my results provide little support for PPP holding against DM for 
countries with close linkages with Germany (i.e., Austria and the Benelux countries) 
during the first two sub-periods examined.34 Focusing on the third sub-period, I fail to 
support PPP for most countries (7 out of 11) in the common currency area (the euro 
zone) including the historical currency partners of Germany.35 Clearly, I do not observe 
PPP holding better in EMU countries during the fixed-rate euro regime. My results do 
not provide evidence in support of PPP holding within a currency bloc (neither in the 
                                                 
 
33 Benelux along with Germany was called the DM zone between 1973 and 1979 (i.e., my first sub-
period). 
34 Netherlands is the only exception among these four countries. PPP is only weakly supported at 10% 
level for Netherlands during the first two sub-periods. 
35 Luxembourg is the only exception.  
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previous DM zone nor in the recent euro zone). In contrast, I observe improvement in 
PPP holding over time for non-EMU countries.36 
To further illustrate my results, I visually depict the timelines of three variables: 
price ratio ( )t*t PP , nominal exchange rate ( )tS , and disparity from 
PPP ( )( )t*ttt PPSlnd = . Figure 1 plots these variables for Greek Drachma and Figure 2 
for Irish Pound, with DM as the numeraire for both. In Figure 1, I can see that nominal 
exchange rate ( )tS  falls while price ratio ( tt PP* ) rises over time. Both trends offset 
each other such that the real exchange rate appears to stay constant. In fact, I can see that 
PPP disparity (dt) for Greece is fluctuating around -5.3 throughout the period examined. 
This is consistent with my empirical results rejecting the unit root hypothesis for Greece 
for all three sub-periods. It is noteworthy that while the nominal exchange rate (St) was 
converging after May 1998 and became fixed against euro (and therefore, DM) after 
January 2001, the price ratio ( tt PP
* ) appears to rise at a decreasing rate and become 
stable after May 1998, and so does the PPP disparity ( td ), which apparently follows the 
trend of the price ratio during the third sub-period. 
In Figure 2, I observe that unlike for Greece, PPP disparity ( td ) for Ireland does 
not converge to some level during the period examined.37 Especially after May 1998, the 
disparity keeps widening. This is consistent with results reported in Table 2; the unit root  
                                                 
 
36 The number of rejections at 1% level increase from only 1 in the first sub-period to 2 in the second sub-
period to 4 in the third sub-period (see Table 2). 
37 We do observe mean reversion during the first two sub-periods. 
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hypothesis for Ireland could not be rejected during the third sub-period.  Figure 2 shows 
that during the first two sub-periods, while the nominal exchange rate (St) falls, the price 
ratio ( tt PP
* ) rises, and these trends offset each other such that the PPP disparity ( td ) 
converges to some level during the first two sub-periods. This is consistent with my 
empirical results that rejected the unit root hypothesis for Ireland before the introduction 
of the euro. However, after May 1998 when the nominal exchange rate (St) was fixed, in 
contrast to Greece, the Irish price ratio ( tt PP
* ) keeps rising without any offset possible 
from a fixed exchange rate. 
In summary, comparing timelines for price ratio and real exchange rate in 
Figures 1 and 2, it is apparent that before the euro, changes in nominal exchange rate 
offset price ratio changes providing a buffer such that real exchange rate remained stable. 
After the euro, the burden to stabilize the real exchange rate fell entirely on adjustment 
in real sector prices because the nominal exchange rate became fixed. The increasing 
price level in Ireland relative to in Germany explains why PPP does not hold during the 
euro sub-period in Ireland as opposed to in Greece. 
 
2.  Structural Break Test Results 
My results do not support the view that market and regulatory innovations associated 
with the monetary union and the adoption of a common currency have improved PPP 
and harmonized prices in the EMU countries. As a robustness test, I now employ another 
approach to verify whether changes associated with the EMU and euro had any impact 
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on the within the currency bloc PPP performance measured against the DM. The results 
of this analysis are reported in Tables 3 and 4.38  
In Table 3, allowing for different (i.e., country specific) coefficients for the time 
dummy variables, results obtained from model 1 with two time dummies show that only 
3 of 11 countries (Austria, Greece, and Italy) in the euro zone have significantly negative 
coefficients for the time dummy representing the third sub-period (fixed-rate euro 
regime) from May 1998 to January 2004 ( 2iγ ). Note that a negative coefficient of i2γ  
implies a smaller iβ  in panel C of Table 2, suggesting that changes associated with euro 
adoption improve PPP performance for Austria, Greece, and Italy (though Table 2 
results show that this improvement for Austria and Italy was not sufficient to reject the 
random walk hypothesis). However, Ireland has a significantly positive coefficient for 
the same time dummy, implying that changes associated with the monetary union have 
worsened price harmonization for it. This is consistent with the Table 2 results that 
rejected the random walk hypothesis at 1% for Ireland in the first two sub-periods but 
not in the third sub-period where it has the highest βi value. In contrast, for countries 
outside the euro zone, only UK has a significantly positive coefficient for the time 
dummy during the third sub-period. Turning to the results from model 2 with only one 
time dummy for the third sub-period, I obtain no significance across the EMU countries 
except Greece with a significantly negative coefficient. 
                                                 
 
38 In Tables 3 and 4, we report estimation results for only the dummy variables because my focus is to 
examine the impact of the euro adoption on PPP. In addition, models in Tables 3 and 4 are not tailored to 
test for the unit root hypothesis so we do not report the coefficients βi and β. 
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Similar to Table 3, Table 4 reports the results of two models obtained by 
imposing the restriction of a common coefficient for all EMU countries and a common 
coefficient for all non-EMU countries. I observe no significant result regardless of the 
model tested and the country group. Hence, from Tables 3 and 4, I am not able to obtain 
any evidence in support of PPP performing better for countries that adopted the common 
currency. If changes associated with euro adoption do improve price convergence and 
harmonization in a fixed-rate environment, my results suggest that this has occurred in 
only a very small number of the EMU countries. This is consistent with what I observe 
in Table 2, which shows a considerable decrease in the number of random walk 
rejections from the second to the third sub-period within the euro zone. 
 
3. Discussion 
Rogoff (2001, p. 243) asserts “…virtually everyone knows by now, exchange rates 
fluctuate wildly in comparison with goods prices… shocks to real exchange rates damp 
out at a remarkably slow rate. Even the most optimistic estimates put the half-life of real 
exchange rate movements in years, not months.” This assertion indeed reflects a 
commonly held view, frequently referred to as the “PPP puzzle” whose basis is the 
voluminous but conflicting empirical evidence on the validity of the PPP with USD as 
the numeraire. While many frictions in the market can fail PPP, weak power of statistical 
procedures can also fail to support it.  
Using a more efficient and robust empirical procedure, I provide evidence 
showing existence of a strong mean reverting tendency in real exchange rates supporting 
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PPP since the advent of floating exchange rates. These results, reported in Table 1, hold 
for 10 of 12 EMU countries (all but Belgium and Luxembourg) and 2 non-EMU 
countries (Japan and Switzerland) during the first sub-period. They continue to hold for 
the same 10 countries in the euro area, the same two non-EMU countries along with the 
UK during the second sub-period. During the third sub-period, PPP is supported for the 
same 2 non-EMU countries but the EMU countries show much weaker evidence 
supporting PPP than during the first two sub-periods.39 These results support PPP in 
general, and it holding between currency blocs in particular. My overall average half-life 
estimates for all sub-periods regarding how quickly shocks to PPP are absorbed range 
from 9 months to 2 years, which is substantially shorter than commonly believed 4 to 5 
years. 
Results obtained using DM as the base currency show that PPP performance did 
not improve with the establishment of the EMS in 1979 and seems to have deteriorated 
after the adoption of a common currency for the EMU countries, i.e., within the euro 
currency bloc.40 With DM, PPP was supported for 8 of 11 countries (Finland, France, 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) during the floating-rate first 
sub-period and for 7 of the 11 countries (Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, and Portugal 
being the exceptions) during the target-zone arrangement second sub-period. However, 
since May 1998, mean reversion in real exchange rates was observed for only 4 
relatively smaller economies out of the 11 euro zone countries (Finland, Greece, 
                                                 
 
39 The number of rejections drops dramatically to 5 in the third sub-period from 10 during each of the first 
two sub-periods. 
40 In fact, they follow the pattern of the results obtained using USD as the base currency since 1973, i.e., 
PPP for the EMU countries worsens during the third sub-period. 
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Luxembourg, and Spain). Despite the very significant structural and regulatory reforms 
implemented to integrate their markets, absence of any evidence indicating PPP holding 
better in EMU countries after they adopted a common currency underscores the critical 
role of floating exchange rates in achieving harmonization of prices.41    
Comparing results obtained using USD as the base currency (Table 1) with those 
using DM as the numeraire (Table 2), I find a similarity in PPP performance between the 
two. PPP performance worsens both within the euro currency bloc and between currency 
blocs (primarily between the euro area and the US) after the introduction of the euro. 
PPP is strongly supported with both USD (between currency blocs, including for the 
euro area countries) and DM during the first two sub-periods. However, since the 
introduction of the euro, while PPP performance did not change much among the non-
EMU countries, PPP performance seems to have deteriorated in the EMU countries 
irrespective of the base currency. All EMU related changes like removal of barriers, 
increased transparency and harmonization of regulations were meant to increase market 
integration.  Therefore, absence of any improvement in price convergence within the 
euro bloc can be attributed to the absence of the adjustment mechanism provided by 
floating exchange rates. 
Even though the “nominal” foreign exchange risk in the EMU countries is 
eliminated with the adoption of a common currency, these countries have seen large 
                                                 
 
41 It is worth noting that with DM, PPP has been holding well for the UK, a member of the EU but not 
EMU. The UK also has virtually no restrictions on cross-border flows of goods and capital with EMU 
countries, but the major difference is that it did not adopt the common currency and its currency pound 
sterling maintains a floating exchange rate against the euro. This may explain why PPP continues to hold 
in the third sub-period for the UK. 
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price level divergence since then. The economically meaningful “real” purchasing power 
risk among these countries seems to have increased (see Adler and Dumas (1983) for the 
role of PPP in international asset pricing and Shapiro (2003) for linkage between PPP 
disparity and real foreign exchange risk). According to Duisenberg (2000), the President 
of the European Central Bank (ECB), different price developments will not disappear in 
general across the EMU countries due to country-specific factors.42 The ECB notes an 
increase in divergences in inflation in the euro area. For example, inflation in Ireland 
differs to a large degree from that for the remaining euro area as a whole. This is 
consistent with my finding that Ireland has the slowest mean reversion (i.e., highest 
coefficient of .979) among all EMU countries in the third sub-period.  
My findings highlight the fact that adoption of a common currency is neither a 
panacea for real risk reduction nor will it insure market integration. This is because even 
with a common currency, there is still “real” inflation/consumption risk, which can exist 
due to different relative prices in different countries (as suggested by my results for the 
third sub-period), presence of non-tradable goods in consumption baskets and 
differences in consumer preferences (Hardouvelis et al. 2001) among other factors. In a 
well functioning floating-rate regime, changes in relative prices are offset by fluctuations 
in nominal exchange rates. As noted earlier, price adjustment to a shock in the goods 
markets is slow relative to the foreign exchange markets. It follows that mean reversion 
to PPP after a shock will be slow with fixed exchange rates or a common currency since 
                                                 
 
42 For details, see the speech delivered by Willem F. Duisenberg on September 6, 2000 
(http://www.ecb.int/). 
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all adjustment must occur in the relatively sluggish real sector prices with no adjustment 
possible via exchange rates. Unless cross-border barriers are fully dismantled to allow 
free flow of all factors of production across countries at negligible cost and governments 
are willing to give up sovereign control of their countries monetary and fiscal policies, a 
common currency will not be a superior alternative to other exchange rate regimes. In 
fact, my results show that PPP in the euro area held much better before the introduction 
of the euro when floating-rate and target-zone arrangement regimes were prevailing. 
Elimination of barriers and increased regulatory and policy harmonization in the EMU 
during the euro sub-period make my results telling. 
The following two quotes suggest that the establishment of the EMU and 
adoption of the euro may be more for political than economic reasons. The President of 
the European Central Bank, Willem F. Duisenberg, in his analysis of economic 
developments in the euro area said, “Over the past few months both pillars of the 
monetary policy strategy of the Eurosystem have indicated that upward risks to price 
stability have increased. … The challenge to turn the current expansion into a prolonged 
period of non-inflationary growth clearly requires further efforts in all policy areas. 
Reforms in the labour market will be a major factor contributing to sustained non-
inflationary growth in the euro area. The current level of unemployment in the euro area, 
despite some decline, is still too high. In this respect, both appropriate wage settlements 
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and structural reforms will be important contributions to continued employment growth 
and to maintaining low inflation.”43  
The increasing relative price instability observed in the euro area implies that 
many member countries were not economically ready prior to the formation of the EMU. 
The fiscal and monetary convergence they achieved right before 1998 was not sustained 
after the euro. In fact, adopting a common currency seems a matter of political belief 
rather than economic analysis. Analyzing UK’s dilemma in joining the EMU, the editor 
of The Observer, William Keegan44, notes, “If there is one thing Dr Watkins' chattering 
classes are agreed on, it is that the decision about the euro will be 'political'. … Few 
people believe the outcome of the tests (about 'sustainable convergence', 'sufficient 
flexibility', the impact on investment, the impact on financial services, and the effect on 
employment) can be 'clear and unambiguous'. No. Almost everyone one meets believes 
this will be a very political decision.” My results are consistent with these views. 
 
F. Conclusion 
I provide stronger evidence in favor of PPP compared to previous studies. Unlike past 
research, I find that PPP holds better between currency blocs than within a currency bloc. 
However, I obtain little evidence supporting PPP and price convergence in most EMU 
countries since the adoption of the euro. My results show that the euro area may not be 
                                                 
 
43 For details, see a speech delivered by Willem F. Duisenberg on June 20, 2000 (http://www.ecb.int/). 
44 For details, see “in my view: who wants to go down in history?” in the Observer by William Keegan 
(editor of The Observer) on January 5, 2003. 
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an optimum currency area, as claimed by some researchers and policy makers. The 
Maastricht Treaty required member countries to converge in monetary and fiscal policies 
prior to the euro. However, will this convergence sustain after the euro? Some member 
countries are likely to deviate from convergence criteria because they have a budget 
deficit, which can result in inflation that exceeds the target level. In addition, cross-
border barriers such as labor immobility (sometimes due to regional cultural ties) 
prevalent in Europe can hinder economic integration as well. These problems may 
partially explain why PPP performance has not improved after the adoption of a 
common currency. Compared to previous experiments with the floating-rate and target-
zone arrangement regimes, the common currency regime does not appear to be as 
successful in converging prices based upon my empirical evidence. My results highlight 
the importance of floating exchange rates despite the volatility inherent in them. 
My findings suggest the need for further dismantling of barriers as well as more 
disciplined and harmonized policy implementation by the EMU governments. However, 
diverging market practices rooted in national traditions and historical experiences could 
also be contributing factors that require passage of time for the market to lose its 
memory. On the other hand, for a few EMU countries where PPP holds after the 
adoption of the euro, the speed of adjustment shows remarkable improvement. This 
observation leads us to believe that perhaps the EMU economies’ price formation 
process is in transition. While it is clear that since the advent of a common currency, 
PPP performance has not improved, there are signs that after the transition stage, what 
may emerge is a more resilient and efficient market than before the monetary union. 
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Nevertheless, this is only possible if benefits of dismantled barriers, policy convergence, 
monetary and fiscal discipline, exchange rate risk elimination, reduced transaction costs 
and economic integration outweigh the benefits of a floating-rate system. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
EFFECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MONETARY UNION ON 
CORPORATE LIQUIDITY 
 
 
This chapter investigates corporate liquidity (cash holdings of firms) from 15 European 
Union (EU) countries [12 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) countries that adopted 
a common currency, euro, and 3 non-EMU countries] from 1993 to 2002 using a 
dynamic panel data model. My main contributions to the corporate liquidity literature are 
four-fold. First, many corporate governance variables, including shareholder rights, have 
been considered important determinants of corporate cash holdings. I provide evidence 
that creditor rights also affect corporate liquidity and show that their effect is more 
consistent than that of shareholder rights. Second, exploiting the recent formation of 
EMU, I show that such significant macro changes in international markets affect firm 
cash holdings. I find that debt and net working capital are better substitutes for cash in 
EMU countries than for non-EMU countries. I also find that adoption of a common 
currency reduces cash holdings in EMU countries. These findings suggest enhanced 
market integration in member countries resulting from their monetary union. Third, a 
variety of results obtained by us suggest that the agency theory plays an important role in 
explaining corporate liquidity. In particular, the agency view of corporate liquidity has 
stronger explanatory power for EMU firms, probably because of an enhanced capital 
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market integration that weakens the transaction and precautionary motives of holding 
cash. Fourth, I show that dealing with the endogeneity problem in corporate liquidity 
studies is important. 
 
A. Introduction 
Why do firms hold cash and what explains variations in their cash holdings? In general, 
firms hold corporate liquidity for transaction costs, precautionary and speculative 
motives.45 More specifically, they use cash to conduct day-to-day operations such as 
paying employees, purchasing inputs, and paying dividends to stockholders. Firms will 
hold less cash if the transaction cost (e.g., cost of liquidating assets or raising capital) is 
lower and vice versa. In addition, they hold cash for the precautionary reason to invest in 
future profitable projects in case they have difficulty raising funds from the capital 
markets. The precautionary motive results from information asymmetry and the agency 
costs of debt (Opler et al. 1999), both of which can make it difficult to raise funds in 
capital markets. Information asymmetry arises because outsiders know less about the 
firm’s operation than management, while agency costs of debt arise when the interests of 
the debt holders differ from those of the shareholders. The higher the level of 
information asymmetry and the agency costs of debt, the greater will be the 
precautionary motive. Further, management might hoard cash because of its personal 
                                                 
 
45 Firms need cash for the speculative motive to take advantage of bargain purchases, but conventional 
wisdom is that liquidity held for speculative motive is relatively minor and negligible compared to that 
held due to transaction and precautionary motives.  
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risk aversion or because it wants to satisfy its own needs, e.g., consuming perquisites, 
termed the agency cost of managerial discretion (Opler et al. 1999).46  
In this chapter, I contribute to the existing international corporate liquidity 
literature in many ways. Many valuation models treat cash as negative debt; the amount 
of cash held by the firm is simply subtracted from the value of debt outstanding in order 
to compute shareholders’ equity in the firm (Acharya et al. 2005). This assumes perfect 
substitutability between cash and debt. On the other hand, no one assumes perfect 
substitutability between cash and equity.  While the relationship between cash and debt 
may not be perfect, cash is much closer to debt than it is to equity.47 Therefore, creditor 
rights should influence the cash holdings of firms more than shareholder rights. Recent 
international corporate liquidity studies have highlighted the importance of shareholder 
rights in a country as a determinant of its firms’ cash holdings (Dittmar et al. 2003), but 
no one has evaluated the role of creditor rights. The first contribution of this chapter is to 
show that creditor rights are a significant determinant of corporate liquidity. 
 The creation of the European Union (EU) comprised of 15 countries, and within 
it the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) of 12 countries that adopted a common 
currency, is considered one of the most important institutional innovations in 
international markets. It provides a unique opportunity to examine what happens to cash 
holdings of firms operating in an area where transactions occurring in multiple 
currencies are reduced to a single currency. Establishment of EMU culminating in a 
                                                 
 
46 Agency costs also include costs incurred to minimize or eliminate the conflict between debt holders and 
equity holders or among different kinds of debt holders. 
47 Opler et al. (1999) note that most of the variables associated with high cash levels are also known to be 
associated with low leverage. 
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common currency should lead to a decrease in transaction costs in the EMU countries. If 
capital markets become more integrated within the EMU, it should make it easier for 
EMU firms to raise funds within the EMU and weaken their precautionary motive for 
holding cash. This should result in lower corporate liquidity in EMU countries in 
contrast to non-EMU countries that retained their national currencies. The test of this 
hypothesis is the second contribution of this chapter, and to my knowledge, the first 
examination of this issue. I also investigate how the institutional changes associated with 
the EMU have affected the sensitivity of corporate liquidity to its benchmark 
determinants (e.g., market-to-book ratio, net working capital, cash flow, etc.). 
Finally, this chapter formally deals with the endogeneity problem associated with 
the determinants of corporate liquidity that has received little attention in the liquidity 
literature. While recent studies have started recognizing this problem, they do not 
account for it.48 Since ignoring the presence of the endogeneity problem can lead to 
biased estimation, my study explicitly deals with this issue and shows that it matters. 
Furthermore, since the agency costs are embedded in each of the extant theories (i.e., 
tradeoff theory, financing hierarchy theory, and agency theory), the predictions of each 
theory about how corporate liquidity is affected by its determinants are inevitably 
intertwining. It is difficult to infer which theory outperforms others from the estimated 
coefficients of the corporate liquidity determinants. Instead of arguing which theory best 
                                                 
 
48 For example, Harford et al. (2005) note that corporate cash holdings and corporate governance can be 
jointly determined, recognizing that the endogeneity problem may arise when modeling the relation 
between these two variables. However, they also note the difficulty in accounting for the endogeneity 
problem using two-stage least squares (2SLS) because of lack of proper instrument variables. Though they 
recognize it, they do not account for it directly in their study. 
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explains corporate liquidity, this chapter evaluates the relevance of agency theory in 
explaining corporate liquidity. I examine the coefficients of the corporate governance 
variables, whose effects are more clearly predicted by the agency theory.  
My data span 1993 to 2002. I analyze all 15 European Union (EU) countries, 
including 12 EMU countries with the euro as their common currency, and 3 non-EMU 
countries which have retained their numeraires, as a control group.49 Many changes 
resulting from the formation of the EU were common to all 15 member states. Therefore, 
selecting the 3 non-EMU country firms as the control group isolates the unique effect of 
the monetary union resulting in the adoption of a common currency on corporate 
liquidity in the 12 EMU countries. Using the dynamic panel data model (Arellano and 
Bond 1991) and accounting for the endogeneity problem associated with the 
determinants of corporate liquidity, I examine corporate cash holdings using a large 
sample of non-US firms. In particular, I investigate how corporate governance variables 
and the monetary union affect corporate liquidity.  
I show that firms in countries with strong creditor rights hold less cash regardless 
of the model specifications. Similarly, the effect of shareholder rights on cash is negative 
but it becomes ambiguous when creditor rights are included in the model. The 
consistently negative effect of creditor rights on cash reiterates that cash is closer to debt 
than equity and shows the importance of incorporating creditor rights in international 
                                                 
 
49 The 12 EMU countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The 3 non-EMU countries are Denmark, Sweden, and the 
United Kingdom (UK). The EU admitted 10 new countries to the Union on May 1, 2004 and these are not 
included in my analysis.  
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liquidity studies. In addition, the harmonization and the subsequent convergence of 
economic and monetary policies in the EMU appear to affect corporate liquidity. For 
example, net working capital and cash are more substitutable for firms in the EMU than 
in the non-EMU countries. I also observe a stronger negative relationship between cash 
and debt in EMU countries, implying that they are better substitutes for the EMU firms 
than for non-EMU firms. This could be the result of enhanced capital market integration 
accompanying the convergence in EMU country policies, which culminated in the 
adoption of a common currency (Croci 2004; Bris et al. 2004). I also obtain evidence 
that adopting a common currency reduces corporate liquidity in the EMU.  
My results show the importance of formally dealing with endogeneity in 
corporate liquidity research. The effect of investment opportunities (proxied by market-
to-book ratio) on cash holdings is positive when the endogeneity problem is ignored. 
However, it becomes significantly negative when endogeneity is accounted for. This is 
consistent with the agency view of corporate liquidity and consistent with the findings of 
Dittmar et al. (2003). My results suggest that the two country-specific corporate 
governance variables (i.e., shareholder rights and creditor rights) play an important role 
in determining corporate liquidity. Additionally, after controlling for country-specific 
corporate governance variables, firm-specific characteristics like market-to-book ratio, 
capital expenditure and insider ownership influence corporate liquidity in a way that 
provides further insights into how agency issues affect liquidity. In particular, from the 
results of the impact of investment opportunities on corporate liquidity, the agency 
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theory appears to explain cash holdings better for the EMU firms than for the non-EMU 
firms. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents 
literature review. Section C provides a brief discussion of the EMU. Section D provides 
the empirical model and my hypotheses development. Section E describes the data 
employed. Section F contains a discussion of my results and Section G concludes this 
chapter. 
  
B. Literature Review 
The early corporate liquidity literature focused on determining whether there is an 
optimal level of cash holdings (Opler et al. 1999). Three major theories have been 
utilized to explain corporate liquidity (i.e., cash and its equivalents): tradeoff theory, 
financing hierarchy theory and agency theory. The tradeoff theory predicts an optimal 
corporate liquidity resulting from firms balancing the marginal cost of corporate 
liquidity and marginal cost of shortage of corporate liquidity (Keynes 1936).50  The 
financing hierarchy theory says that internal financing is preferred to external financing 
to fund new investments because internal financing is less costly. Firms will accumulate 
cash and repay debt when they have a surplus of internal funds; when they are short of 
internal funds, they issue debt to fund new investments. According to this view, 
                                                 
 
50 According to Opler et al. (1999), marginal cost of corporate liquidity involves the return that could be 
earned by investing the amount of cash holdings in other assets. Marginal cost of shortage of corporate 
liquidity incorporate potential bankruptcy cost. Cash holding and financial distress are negatively related.  
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corporate liquidity is determined by changes in internal funds and thus there is no 
optimal corporate liquidity (Myers and Majluf 1984; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999). 
The agency theory suggests that the management tends to hoard cash to gain 
discretionary power; therefore, there is no optimal corporate liquidity (Jensen 1986). The 
predictions of each theory regarding the effect of firm characteristics (e.g., size, cash 
flow, investment opportunity set, etc.) on corporate liquidity are mostly inconsistent. 
Since previous researchers (Kim et al. 1998; Opler et al. 1999; Myers 1984; Jensen 1986) 
have discussed the predictions of these theories in detail, I simply summarize the 
theoretical predictions of each theory in Appendix B without elaboration. 
Past studies analyze the determinants of corporate liquidity to see which theory is 
supported by empirical evidence. The benchmark determinants of corporate liquidity 
include market-to-book ratio, firm size, cash flow, net working capital, leverage, 
industry-specific cash flow variability, capital expenditure, dividend, shareholder rights, 
and managerial ownership (Opler et al. 1999). Recent corporate liquidity literature can 
be categorized into the following three categories: (1) studies using US data (Kim et al. 
1998, Opler et al. 1999, Faulkender 2004, Harford et al. 2005), (2) single-country studies 
using non-US data (Pinkowitz and Williamson 2001, Ozkan and Ozkan 2004) and (3) 
studies using multi-country data (Dittmar et al. 2003, Pinkowitz et al. 2003, Kalcheva 
and Lins 2004, Ferreira and Vilela 2004). All of these studies attempt to identify the 
determinants of corporate liquidity and/or the theory that explains corporate liquidity 
better. Since the three theories’ predictions of the relationship between corporate 
liquidity and its determinants are not mutually exclusive (see Appendix B), it is difficult 
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to empirically support one theory over the others unambiguously. All studies (including 
this one) suffer from this. The agency theory is relatively less prone to this problem 
since it provides unique predictions on the relationship between corporate liquidity and 
corporate governance variables like ownership structure and the degree of investor 
protection (see Appendix B).  
Kim et al. (1998) explored corporate liquidity in the US industrial firms and 
found a positive relationship between optimal corporate liquidity and cost of external 
financing. Firms with lower returns and higher volatility of earnings on physical assets 
(relative to liquid assets) tended to have higher corporate liquidity. They also observe a 
positive relation between corporate liquidity and measures of future economic conditions. 
Unlike them, Opler et al. (1999) attempt to determine the relative merit of alternative 
theories to explain corporate liquidity in the US. Their results support the tradeoff theory 
over the other two. Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) study corporate liquidity in Japan 
and find a positive relationship between corporate liquidity and bank power. Ozkan and 
Ozkan (2004) examine corporate liquidity in the UK. One of their findings is the 
nonlinear relationship between corporate liquidity and managerial ownership.  
In general, the extant literature does not clearly reveal which theory plays a 
dominant role in explaining corporate liquidity. There are several reasons for this. As 
noted earlier, these theories do not yield mutually exclusive predictions regarding the 
relationship between cash holdings and their determinants, agency costs are involved in 
each of the three theories, and the use of inappropriate methodology may have 
contributed to the inconclusive results. However, the predictions of the agency theory 
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regarding relationship between corporate liquidity and the corporate governance 
variables affecting agency costs do lend themselves to relatively unambiguous testing. 
Most studies examining corporate liquidity and corporate governance are conducted in a 
single country environment (e.g., Opler et al. 1999; Kim et al. 1998; Pinkowitz and 
Williamson 2001; Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). Only recently have researchers started 
paying attention to this issue from a multi-country perspective. This vantage point allows 
conducting richer tests for the agency theory explanation of cash holdings since multi-
country data has wide variation of country-specific characteristics, i.e., corporate 
governance variables at the country level.  
Following Dennis and McConnell’s (2003) observation that simply replicating 
the research that has been conducted using the U.S. data in other countries without 
considering the impact of country-specific corporate governance variables will suffer 
from a misspecification problem, Dittmar et al. (2003) include shareholder rights in their 
study. Using cross-sectional data for only one year (1998) from 45 countries, they find 
shareholder rights the most important determinant of corporate liquidity. Firms hold less 
cash in countries with higher shareholder rights, which Dittmar et al. (2003) interpret as 
evidence supporting the agency theory. In countries with high shareholder rights, other 
determinants of corporate liquidity become less important. Kalcheva and Lins (2004) 
examine corporate liquidity in 31 countries and find that cash holdings are higher in 
firms with more severe agency problems. They also find stronger positive relationship 
between cash holdings and effective managerial control when shareholder rights are 
weaker. Like Dittmar et al. (2003), they also use only one-year cross-sectional data (for 
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1996). The use of cross-sectional data for just one year rather than panel data by these 
studies precludes identifying the dynamic nature of the cash holding decision.  
However, cash is a much closer substitute for debt (Acharya et al. 2005) than for 
equity. Since debt holders are predominantly concerned about creditor rights, it follows 
that creditor rights should have a more systematic effect on corporate cash holdings than 
shareholder rights. Lenders in countries with higher creditor rights are exposed to lower 
risks and will be more willing to lend to firms than in countries with low creditor rights. 
Accordingly, firms will hold less cash in countries where creditors enjoy better 
protection since it is easier to borrow in their capital markets. Ferreira and Vilela (2004) 
examine  cash holdings in EMU countries and observe a negative effect of both creditor 
rights and shareholder rights on corporate liquidity. However, they obtain results using a 
static model and ignore the problem of endogeneity in their variables. My study formally 
deals with these issues and furthermore, exploits the unique event of EMU formation to 
obtain further insights into what determines corporate liquidity. 
It is well recognized that the economic and political environment in which a firm 
operates influences its use of factor inputs. Innovations in its environment can affect the 
more fundamental determinants of corporate liquidity, i.e., the nature of real and 
financial asset markets in which a firm transacts and which gives rise to corporate cash 
flows as well as risks borne by the firm. The establishment of EMU and the adoption of 
a common currency, the euro, is one of the most significant recent institutional 
innovations in international markets. This event provides us a unique opportunity to shed 
further light on the determinants of corporate liquidity. The harmonization process 
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associated with the EMU resulted in free movement of capital between member states, 
convergence in fiscal and monetary policies, and price transparency within the EMU as a 
direct consequence of adopting the common currency. This also alleviated the need to 
exchange national currencies and therefore eliminated currency risk from all transactions 
within the EMU. These dramatic changes should affect corporate liquidity as well as its 
sensitivity to its underlying determinants in the EMU. Firms in my test sample and the 
control sample belong to the EU. Therefore, both samples are affected by similar 
regulatory and structural changes associated with the EU except that the 12-nation EMU 
group converged in economic and monetary policies and adopted a common currency. 
Using a dummy variable to distinguish the EMU group, my research design allows us to 
isolate the unique effect of the EMU on corporate liquidity.  
This chapter contributes to the liquidity literature in many ways. First, I provide 
evidence that creditor rights are a better proxy for investor protection than shareholder 
rights in studies attempting to explain corporate liquidity. Second, I extend the 
international liquidity literature by analyzing the 15 European countries over a unique 
ten-year span from 1993 to 2002 and reveal how a monetary union affects corporate 
liquidity. Third, I carefully account for the endogeneity problem associated with the 
determinants of corporate liquidity and show that it matters.  Lastly, I obtain evidence 
that suggests that agency issues play an important role in explaining cash holdings of 
firms.  
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C. The Structural Change: EMU and Euro  
European countries have been trying to form a united Europe since more than half a 
century ago. Shortly after the Second World War, several Treaties have been signed to 
achieve this goal. The Treaty of Paris was signed in 1951 to set up European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC). In 1957, the Treaty of Rome was signed to set up the 
European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom). Subsequently, the Single European Act was signed in 1986, the Treaty on 
European Union was signed in 1992 and the European Union (EU) came into being. All 
these steps were taken to enhance political and economic integration among the member 
countries. 
The creation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the euro was the 
culmination of this lengthy economic and political process and considered by many 
scholars as the most significant institutional innovations to occur in international markets. 
In March 1979, the European Monetary System (EMS) was established to foster 
monetary stabilization. However, the exchange rate regime adopted at that time proved 
to be inadequate and finally led to speculative currency attacks in 1992-1993. In 1992, 
the Maastricht Treaty was signed to promote monetary stabilization and form the 
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).51 The Treaty specified a gradual adjustment 
process to a union with countries converging in monetary and fiscal policies to some 
                                                 
 
51 According to the glossary provided by http://europa.eu.int, “Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is 
the name given to the process of harmonizing the economic and monetary policies of the member states of 
the Union with a view to the introduction of a single currency, the euro.” In this chapter, in addition to the 
above definition, EMU also means the union of 12 countries, depending on the context. 
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desired level, and ultimately forming an EMU and adopting a common currency. The 
fixed bilateral foreign exchange rates of the 12 EMU countries against the Deutsche 
Mark were established in 1998 leading to the euro in 1999, which became the sole legal 
tender of the 12 EMU countries in 2002.52 
 My second research question is to determine whether EMU (i.e., broadly 
speaking, the process of harmonizing economic and monetary policies of the member 
states) has a unique effect on corporate liquidity. Reforms such as deregulation and 
reduced barriers to factor mobility have been common to all 15 EU countries, but only 
12 countries converged in fiscal and monetary policies and finally adopted the common 
currency; the remaining three have retained their national currencies. By using firms 
belonging to these three countries as the control group, I can isolate the unique effect of 
EMU on corporate liquidity in my test sample. In addition, the last stage of EMU 
features the adoption of a common currency, which eliminates exchange rate risk, 
currency conversion costs and the need to maintain cash in different currencies (which 
existed prior to the euro) by firms of one EMU country operating in another. Adoption 
of the common currency and converging economic and monetary policies should reduce 
product and capital market imperfections and enhance market integration in the common 
currency area. For these reasons, I expect the test sample EMU firms to hold less cash 
after adopting the common currency than firms in the non-EMU control group. 
 
                                                 
 
52 For information about the fixed bilateral foreign exchange rates of the 12 EMU countries against the 
Deutsche Mark, please visit 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l25017.htm;http://www.portugal.org/information/economic4/info_
1l.html 
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D. The Model and Hypothesis Development  
In this section, I first describe my methodology and empirical model obtained from my 
theoretical model in Appendix C. Then I explain how each variable is expected to affect 
corporate liquidity based on my theoretical model predictions.  
 
1. Empirical Model 
Virtually all previous studies utilize ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to analyze 
corporate liquidity. Following these studies, I also employed OLS. However, the simple 
OLS regressions fail to consider the endogeneity problem (Harvey et al. 2004; Ozkan 
and Ozkan 2004), which very likely exists when dealing with financial variables in the 
balance sheet and income statement because they are simultaneously determined. 
Variables used in previous corporate liquidity studies as well as this chapter are likely to 
be simultaneously determined as well (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996). Ignoring the 
endogeneity problem will cause the estimators to be biased.  
Though I perform simple OLS regressions to provide a basis for comparison with 
the results of previous studies, I employ the dynamic panel data model for my analysis, 
which allows us to overcome the endogeneity problem (Arellano and Bond 1991).53  
                                                 
 
53 First, panel data model rather than the OLS is fit for my data, which is both cross sectional and time 
series. Second, rather than using the static model, we chose the dynamic one. There is always a question 
about whether to choose fixed or random effects for the static panel data model. With the dynamic panel 
data model, however, it becomes irrelevant whether the true model has fixed or random effects. The 
reason is that individual effects will be purged by first differencing, which is the first step in estimating the 
dynamic model, irrespective of fixed or random effects exist. Further, unlike static corporate cash holdings 
models that implicitly assume instantaneous adjustment to a desired cash level in response to a random 
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This model has been used in recent finance and economics literature (e.g., Hayashi and 
Inoue 1991; Blundell et al. 1992; Bond and Meghir 1994; Judson and Owen 1999; 
Ozkan and Ozkan 2004). I used STATA 8 to estimate the dynamic panel data model. 
Building on Anderson and Hsiao (1981, 1982), Arellano and Bond (1991) used the 
GMM framework developed by Hansen (1982) to identify valid instruments from lagged 
levels of the dependent variable and the independent variables, including predetermined 
and endogenous variables. They also showed how to put together these lagged levels and 
differences of the strictly exogenous variables to form an instrument matrix. This 
dynamic panel data model allows us to account for endogeneity problem by using levels 
lagged two or more periods of some endogenous variable as valid instrumental variables 
to obtain consistent estimators (Arellano and Bond 1991). The following model is used 
to estimate effects of the determinants of corporate liquidity.  
ititittiit uzxyy +++= − γβδ 1, ,  
where the error term itu  is specified as a two-way error component model: 
ittiitu νλμ ++= , 2738,,1 K=i , iTt ,,1 K= ,  
                                                                                                                                                
 
shock, we assume that cash adjustment is costly and immediate adjustment is not likely. It follows that the 
appropriate model should include a lag of corporate cash holdings as one of the determinants (Ozkan and 
Ozkan 2004). 
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where iμ  denotes a firm-specific effect and tλ  denotes a year-specific effect54 ,55 ,56; 
subscript i denotes the ith firm and t denotes the tth year.57 ity , corporate liquidity, is the 
natural log of the ratio of cash and its equivalents to total assets. itx  is a set of 
endogenous variables, including benchmark determinants for corporate liquidity such as 
market-to-book ratio, size, net working capital/assets, cash flow/assets, capital 
expenditure/assets, leverage, and dividend payouts/earnings. itz is a set of exogenous 
variables, including firm-specific variable such as insider ownership and country-
specific variables such as shareholder rights and creditor rights.58 It also includes dummy 
variables like the EMU dummy and the euro dummy. The model was estimated by a 
first-difference transformation. The first- and second-order autocorrelations in the first 
differenced residuals are reported. Since I applied two-step estimation, I am more 
concerned with the second-order autocorrelation because its presence implies that the 
estimates are inconsistent. The Sargan test was also conducted to test for over-
identification restrictions by testing whether the residuals and instruments are 
independent.  
                                                 
 
54 Each firm i has its unique number of years Ti because some firms in my sample have unbalanced data. 
55 Even though the firms that we are interested in come from the same category (i.e., industrial), there are 
always time-invariant firm-specific effects because firms are likely to be heterogeneous. We use as many 
variables as possible to account for the firm-specific nature, but we also introduced this firm-specific 
dummy variable to capture any remaining firm-specific effects.  
56 Time (or year) dummies are also created to represent year-specific effect from 1993 to 2002. There can 
be some economic events associated with a specific year during the time span (1993-2002) of my data. For 
example, in response to the currency crisis of 1993, some EU countries might have taken some specific 
steps to meet the convergence criteria in certain years after 1993. This necessitates the inclusion of time 
dummy variables in the model to capture those shocks associated with particular year(s). 
57 See Ozkan and Ozkan (2004) for an application of this methodology to corporate liquidity. 
58 Unlike Dittmar et al. (2003), we use levels of shareholder rights and creditor rights as constructed by La 
Porta et al. (1998) instead of creating dichotomous dummy variables. Levels allow for using more 
information than dichotomous dummy variables. 
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2. The Lagged Dependent Variable 
One unique feature of my estimation model is the inclusion of lagged corporate liquidity 
as a regressor or a determinant of corporate liquidity. I hypothesize that immediate 
adjustment is not possible due to the presence of transaction and adjustment costs, so the 
model should involve a lag of corporate liquidity as a determinant. Such adjustment lags 
are becoming well recognized in recent capital structure literature (Fisher et. al 1989; 
Fama and French 2002; Frank and Goyal 2003; Roberts and Leary 2005). My null 
hypothesis is that the coefficient for the lag of corporate liquidity is zero against the 
alternative that the coefficient is not equal to zero. 
 
3. Effect of the Euro on Corporate Liquidity 
Next, I examine whether the structural change resulting from the establishment of the 
EMU and the adoption of a common currency has affected corporate liquidity. If the 
EMU markets become more integrated due to the convergence process and the 
introduction of the euro, the opportunity cost of holding cash should be higher as 
transactions and relative values become more transparent and the need to convert 
currencies reduces. Consequently, managers will perceive holding cash to be more costly 
with the introduction of the euro. Based on equation 4 (see Appendix C), corporate 
liquidity should decline in response to an increase in the opportunity cost. In addition, 
the cost of capital should go down to the extent that financial markets become more 
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integrated in the EMU.59 According to equation 5 (see Appendix C), corporate liquidity 
should decline in response to a decrease in the cost of capital. Due to these reasons, the 
EMU firms should see a decline in corporate liquidity relative to non-EMU firms.  
 To test this hypothesis, I examined the partial effect of the euro on corporate 
liquidity by performing multivariate analysis and controlling for other determinants of 
corporate liquidity. I examined whether the EMU firms decreased their corporate 
liquidity, ceteris paribus, in a statistically significant manner during the euro period.60
  
4. Effect of EMU on Sensitivity of Corporate Liquidity to Its Determinants 
EMU may change the way some variables (determinants of corporate liquidity, X1 and X2) 
affect corporate liquidity. For example, firms tend to hoard cash from cash flow because 
raising external funds from the capital markets is costly. Therefore, previous studies 
typically observe a positive effect of cash flow on corporate liquidity. This effect should 
be weaker for the EMU firms if EMU countries’ capital markets become more integrated.  
In other words, corporate liquidity in the EMU countries will then be less sensitive to 
cash flow compared to the non-EMU countries. Similarly, EMU might have also 
                                                 
 
59 Bris et al. (2004) provides empirical evidence consistent with this. 
60 The test examined whether the coefficient for D98* DEMU is significant after 1998. D98 takes on a value 
of 1 if the year is 1998 or after and 0 otherwise; DEMU takes on a value of 1 if the country belongs to the 
EMU and 0 otherwise. The European Council approved the entry of the 11 countries in to the EMU on 
May 2 1998. Bilateral exchange rates between 11 EMU countries were fixed on May 3, 1998 
(http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l25017.htm;http://www.portugal.org/information/economic4/info
_1l.html). My null hypothesis is that the coefficient on D98* DEMU is zero while the alternative hypothesis 
is that the coefficient is negative.  The year 1998 is the time when participating countries were ready for 
the establishment of the EMU. Hence, we chose 1998 as the breaking year even though the euro was 
formally created on January 1, 1999. Bris et al. (2004) provides evidence that the structural break occurred 
in 1998.  
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changed the effect of other determinants of corporate liquidity. To test this hypothesis, I 
created interaction variables by multiplying some determinants by a dummy (i.e., d in 
equation (6)) representing EMU. Then I examined the coefficients for those interaction 
variables to see if they are statistically different from zero.  
 
E. Data 
I use firm-specific annual financial data from Compact D Worldscope (CD Version of 
March 2003).61,62 To ensure that my sample was comprised of firms with data available 
during pre-euro period, I identified all firms from the 15 EU countries with data 
available at least up to year 1999. I retrieved data for all such non-financial firms from 
15 EU countries, including 12 EMU as well as 3 non-EMU countries.63,64 I selected 
these 3 non-EMU countries as the control group because they have been in the EU with 
the 12 EMU countries during my sample period, but they have not adopted a common 
                                                 
 
61 The only exception is the ownership data (closely held shares as percentage of total outstanding stocks, 
i.e., fraction of closely held shares outstanding). These were obtained from Global Researcher’s 
Worldscope from 1993 to 1998 only. We took an average of ownership data for each firm over this period 
and used it in my analysis given that there is little or no change in ownership.  
62 The use of this data in international corporate liquidity literature is standard. While accounting 
differences across countries exist, Worldscope data analysts minimize this by adopting specific 
procedures. For example, they define each data item precisely in a standard way. To increase 
comparability, any reported data items different from their definitions are standardized. If there is any 
variation in formats, Worldscope conform the different formats into their standard industry templates. 
They also apply other standardization procedures to reconcile various reported data items reported due to 
different accounting systems, countries, industries and languages (Worldscope Database Data Definitions 
Guide 2000). 
63 We also exclude non-financial firms belonging to the division of public administration with 2-digit SIC 
code ranging from 91 through 99 because they are government-related and may be quite different from the 
private firms in terms of corporate liquidity.  
64 The EMU group consists of Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain. The non-EMU group includes Denmark, Sweden, and 
the UK. 
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currency. The data span 10 years from 1993 to 2002. Appendix D defines the raw data 
obtained from Worldscope. These data were manipulated to obtain empirical variables 
used in this chapter. A brief description of how these variables were derived follows. All 
variables used are ratios other than the natural log of size, i.e., total assets. 
My key variable is corporate liquidity, which I define as the ratio of cash and its 
equivalents to total assets (CH/TA). My selection of determinants follows previous 
research. I use the market-to-book ratio as the proxy for investment opportunities and 
computed it as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity plus the 
market value of equity divided by total assets. Size is proxied by total assets. Net 
working capital proxies an additional liquid asset, which previous research has found a 
substitute for corporate liquidity. I measure net working capital (NWC) as total current 
assets less cash less total current liabilities. Firm’s profitability is proxied by cash flow, 
which is defined as earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA), less interest, taxes, and common dividends.  
Capital expenditure/assets proxies potential investment opportunities (Kacheva 
and Lins 2004) and is measured as additions to fixed assets as a fraction of total assets 
(Kexp). Leverage (Lev) (total debt as a fraction of total assets) is included because it has 
been considered a key determinant of corporate liquidity, and the financing hierarchy 
theory gives a clear prediction of its (negative) effect on corporate liquidity. Dividend 
payout is common stock dividends as a fraction of earnings, and I use it as a corporate 
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governance variable affecting agency costs as is insider ownership. It is measured as 
shares held by insiders as a fraction of common shares outstanding.65  
Country-specific data include shareholder rights and creditor rights. Both 
shareholder rights and creditor rights come from measures constructed by La Porta et al. 
(1998). They constructed indices to proxy shareholder rights and creditor rights, ranging 
from 0 to 6 and 0 to 4, respectively. Higher (lower) index value means higher (lower) 
shareholder or creditor rights. These indices are used to proxy the degree of investor 
protection in a country.  
As is common with international data, a careful examination of all data revealed 
some outliers. To ensure that each observation (firm-year) makes economic sense, I 
retained observations that satisfy the following criteria:  
1
TA
CH0 ≤≤ , 1Lev0 ≤≤ , 1
TA
NWC1 ≤≤−  , 1≤Kexp , and 1
TA
FA0 ≤≤ .66 
After applying the above data screening procedures, the remaining sample comprises 
2,683 firms and 10,438 firm-year observations. On average, each firm has 3.9 years of 
data. My estimator is appropriate for this unbalanced panel.  
Table 5 provides descriptive statistics of corporate liquidity across 15 countries, 
which further break down into 2 sub-groups, the 12 EMU and 3 non-EMU countries. 
The average corporate liquidity across 15 countries is 11.1%, ranging from 3.0% 
(Luxembourg) to 15.8% (Denmark). Among the EMU countries, France has the highest 
                                                 
 
65 Insiders include directors, officers and their immediate families as well as individuals who hold 5% or 
more of the outstanding shares (Worldscope Database Data Definitions Guide 2000). 
66 FA/TA denotes the ratio of fixed assets to total assets. It is not included as the determinant for corporate 
liquidity in my study, but is used to ensure that firms included in my study have data that makes sense. 
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Table 5 
Descriptive statistics for corporate liquidity, 1993-2002 
 
This table presents summary statistics of each country’s mean, percentiles (p25, p50, and p75), 
standard deviation, and number of observations (firm-years). It also presents summary statistics 
for the EMU, non-EMU, and the total samples. The sample includes firms belonging to 12 EMU 
countries and 3 non-EMU countries which are members of the EU from Compact D Worldscope, 
1993-2002. Corporate liquidity is the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. 
  
standard no. 
Country mean P25 p50 p75 
deviation observations 
Austria  0.133 0.034 0.079 0.166 0.157 563 
Belgium  0.135 0.043 0.078 0.176 0.137 645 
Finland  0.136 0.041 0.081 0.177 0.147 777 
France  0.141 0.038 0.090 0.188 0.149 3,674 
Germany  0.078 0.002 0.014 0.068 0.154 1,229 
Greece  0.090 0.007 0.021 0.063 0.180 33 
Ireland  0.063 0.005 0.012 0.058 0.104 104 
Italy  0.044 0.004 0.018 0.048 0.075 265 
Luxembourg  0.030 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.097 15 
Netherlands  0.039 0.001 0.005 0.030 0.095 173 
Portugal  0.035 0.000 0.012 0.049 0.068 43 
Spain  0.050 0.003 0.017 0.039 0.085 70 
EMU 0.120 0.023 0.066 0.162 0.149 7,591 
        
Denmark  0.158 0.040 0.103 0.229 0.165 992 
Sweden  0.117 0.012 0.047 0.160 0.158 104 
UK  0.044 0.000 0.007 0.040 0.094 1,751 
Non-EMU 0.086 0.003 0.027 0.110 0.137 2,847 
       
Total 0.111 0.014 0.055 0.149 0.146 10,438 
  
74
average corporate liquidity (14.1%) while Luxembourg has the lowest (3.0%). Among 
the non-EMU countries, Denmark has the highest corporate liquidity (15.8%) while the 
UK has the lowest (4.4%). The median tells a similar story. Overall, Denmark has the 
highest median corporate liquidity (10.3%) while Luxembourg still has the lowest 
(0.1%). Among the EMU countries, France has the highest median corporate liquidity 
(9.0%) while Luxembourg has the lowest (0.1%). Among the non-EMU countries, 
Denmark has the highest median corporate liquidity (10.3%) while the UK has the 
lowest (0.7%). My summary statistics are similar to those provided by Ferreira and 
Vilela (2004). 
Focusing on the summary statistics for two sub-groups, the EMU firms have 
higher mean corporate liquidity (12.0%) than for the non-EMU firms (8.6%). In addition, 
median corporate liquidity for the EMU (6.6%) is also higher than that for the non-EMU 
(2.7%). Hence, it appears that over the whole test period, corporate liquidity in the EMU 
firms is higher than in non-EMU firms.  
Table 6 provides the averages for various determinants of corporate liquidity by 
country over the test period. Overall, the EMU firms have lower market-to-book ratio as 
well as dividend and higher net working capital, cash flow, leverage, size, and capital 
expenditure than the non-EMU firms. It is worth noting that non-EMU firms enjoy better 
shareholder rights and creditor rights than EMU firms. In addition, insider ownership is 
lower in the non-EMU firms than in the EMU firms. 
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Table 6 
Averages for determinants of corporate liquidity by country, 1993-2002 
 
This table provides averages for the determinants of corporate liquidity by country. Market-to-book ratio is defined as the book value of 
total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by total assets. Net working capital is defined as total 
current assets less cash less total current liabilities. Cash flow is earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA), less interest, taxes, and common dividends. Leverage is total debt as a fraction of total assets. Shareholder rights and creditor 
rights are summary measures of shareholder and creditor protection, ranging from 0 to 6 and 0 to 4, respectively. Both variables are 
derived from La Porta et al. (1998). Ownership represents shares held by insiders as a fraction of common shares outstanding. Size is the 
natural log of total assets. Capital expenditure/assets is additions to fixed assets over total assets. Dividend is common dividends as a 
fraction of earnings. The values for EMU, non-EMU and total samples are weighted averages. 
 
Country Market-to-book ratio 
Net working capital/ 
assets 
Cash flow/ 
assets Leverage 
Shareholder 
rights 
Creditor 
rights Ownership Size 
Capital expenditure/ 
assets Dividend 
Austria 1.061 0.058 0.071 0.248 2 3 0.591 12.018 0.073 0.276 
Belgium 1.389 0.028 0.084 0.248 0 2 0.573 12.165 0.080 0.234 
Finland 1.603 0.084 0.088 0.261 3 1 0.419 12.085 0.083 0.285 
France 1.332 0.052 0.065 0.216 3 0 0.586 11.706 0.061 0.190 
Germany 1.561 0.079 0.037 0.198 1 3 0.639 11.327 0.082 0.211 
Greece 1.549 0.073 0.100 0.187 2 1 0.699 11.000 0.046 0.432 
Ireland 1.436 0.039 0.025 0.174 4 1 0.376 11.065 0.075 0.123 
Italy 1.198 -0.070 0.028 0.249 1 2 0.545 12.292 0.051 0.220 
Luxembourg 0.985 0.018 -0.023 0.343 . . 0.846 12.104 0.127 0.009 
Netherlands 1.439 -0.006 0.040 0.225 2 2 0.506 11.371 0.064 0.158 
Portugal 0.699 -0.127 0.052 0.227 3 1 0.511 11.617 0.070 0.277 
Spain 0.974 -0.132 0.038 0.225 4 2 0.383 11.737 0.044 0.193 
EMU  1.374 0.050 0.062 0.224 2.3 1.1 0.563 11.747 0.069 0.213 
           
Denmark 1.259 0.075 0.081 0.256 2 3 0.242 11.595 0.064 0.187 
Sweden 2.010 -0.208 0.057 0.149 3 2 0.352 10.372 0.058 0.150 
UK 2.328 -0.038 0.019 0.164 5 4 0.330 10.756 0.065 0.237 
Non-EMU  1.950 -0.005 0.043 0.196 3.9 3.6 0.300 11.034 0.065 0.216 
           
Total 1.539 0.035 0.056 0.216 2.7 1.8 0.482 11.553 0.068 0.214 
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F. Empirical Results  
I obtained the correlation matrix between corporate liquidity and its determinants before 
performing multivariate analysis.67 I found that the determinants of corporate liquidity 
indeed correlate with corporate liquidity. My correlation results suggest the need to 
include them for estimation.68 Next, I present results from static regressions including 
pooled OLS cross-country regressions and between-effect panel data regressions first 
and then dynamic panel data estimation results.  
 
1. Static Regressions 
Table 7 consists of three panels. Panel A presents the simple OLS results, which are 
comparable to the estimation results reported in previous liquidity studies. Panel B 
presents the results of between-effect panel data regressions. Panel C shows the results 
of between-effect panel data regressions including the EMU dummy. There are six 
models in each panel.69  In each panel, models 1 through 3 use the full sample while 
models 4 through 6 use only observations with insider ownership data available. 
Approximately 25% of my observations have missing insider ownership data, which is  
                                                 
 
67 We do not report these results for space consideration, but will provide them upon request.  
68 We obtained the directed acyclic graphs (DAG) representation software from David Bessler (Bessler 
and Yang 2003) that provides a structure of causality among corporate liquidity and its determinants. 
According to DAG representation, corporate liquidity has three direct causes, i.e., leverage, net working 
capital, and creditor rights, suggesting that corporate liquidity is a function of these three variables. This 
observation is consistent with my empirical results that these three variables have significant effects on 
corporate liquidity (see Tables 3 through 6 for details). In addition, the graph also shows four causal roots 
such as market-to-book ratio, capital expenditure and dividend payout, all of which turn out to be 
influential in my regression results.  It is interesting to note that unlike the creditor rights, the DAG 
representation does not identify shareholder rights as a causal variable.            
69 In all models, industry dummies were included to capture industry-specific effects. 
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Table 7 
Static regressions, 1993-2002 
 
Panel A presents pooled OLS cross-country regression results and panel B presents between-
effect panel data regression results; panel C presents results of between-effect panel data 
regression with the EMU dummy (DEMU) included.  The dependent variable for all models is the 
natural log of the ratio of cash and its equivalents to total assets (Cash). Market-to-book ratio is 
defined as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of 
equity divided by total assets. Size is the natural log of total assets. Net working capital is 
defined as total current assets less cash less total current liabilities. Cash flow is earnings before 
interest and taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), less interest, taxes, and common 
dividends. Capital expenditure/assets is additions to fixed assets over total assets. Leverage is 
total debt as a fraction of total assets. Dividend is common dividends as a fraction of earnings. 
Shareholder rights and creditor rights are summary measures of shareholder and creditor 
protection, ranging from 0 to 6 and 0 to 4, respectively. Both variables are derived from La Porta 
et al. (1998). Ownership represents shares held by insiders as a fraction of common shares 
outstanding. Ownership squared represents the square of ownership. DEMU takes on 1 if a firm 
belongs to EMU and 0 otherwise. In all models, industry dummies were included to capture 
industry-specific effects. N represents the number of observations (firm-years); n stands for the 
number of firms. The numbers in the parentheses are t-statistics. ***, ** and * indicate 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
(A) Pooled OLS cross-country regressions, 1993-2002 
Independent variable Full sample Firms with ownership data available 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Market-to-book ratio 0.013 (1.52) 
0.017* 
(2.10) 
0.025*** 
(3.15) 
0.049*** 
(3.67) 
0.046*** 
(3.46) 
0.046*** 
(3.47) 
Size 0.305*** (19.57) 
0.247***  
(16.22) 
0.216*** 
(14.35) 
0.234*** 
(12.9) 
0.204*** 
(11.28) 
0.205*** 
(11.32) 
Net working capital/assets -0.626*** (-5.15) 
-0.692 *** 
(-5.94) 
-0.933*** 
(-8.11) 
-0.931*** 
(-6.84) 
-0.899*** 
(-6.71) 
-0.889*** 
(-6.63) 
Cash flow/assets 2.877*** (11.92) 
2.569***  
(11.03) 
2.385*** 
(10.45) 
4.748*** 
(15.18) 
4.580*** 
(14.85) 
4.577*** 
(14.84) 
Capital expenditure/assets -2.626*** (-6.52) 
-1.643*** 
(-4.24) 
-2.072*** 
(-5.44) 
-2.574*** 
(-5.32) 
-2.674*** 
(-5.61) 
-2.643*** 
(-5.54) 
Leverage -2.673*** (-16.23) 
-2.640*** 
(-16.69) 
-2.877*** 
(-18.5) 
-2.637*** 
(-13.85) 
-2.710*** 
(-14.44) 
-2.685*** 
(-14.28) 
Dividend -0.398*** (-3.63) 
-0.122 
(-1.15) 
-0.070 
(-0.67) 
0.039 
(0.31) 
0.088 
(0.71) 
0.090 
(0.72) 
Shareholder rights -0.338*** (-17.78)  
-0.298*** 
(-16.55) 
-0.227*** 
(-10.33) 
-0.295*** 
(-13.16) 
-0.292*** 
(-13.00) 
Creditor rights  -0.476*** (-28.92) 
-0.455*** 
(-28.12) 
-0.409*** 
(-20.39) 
-0.490*** 
(-23.42) 
-0.492*** 
(-23.49) 
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Table 7 Continued (A) Pooled OLS cross-country regressions, 1993-2002 
Independent variable Full sample Firms with ownership data available 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Ownership     -1.583*** (-11.8) 
-2.398*** 
(-5.06) 
Ownership squared      0.892*
70 
(1.79) 
Constant -5.015*** (-14.41) 
-4.579*** 
(-13.8) 
-3.329*** 
(-9.98) 
-4.662*** 
(0.31) 
-3.091*** 
(-9.16) 
-3.000*** 
(-8.79) 
N 6386 6386 6386 4576 4576 4576 
Adjusted R2 0.170 0.230 0.262 0.2649 0.287 0.287 
                                                 
 
70 The p-value for ownership squared in model 6 is 0.073, which enables us to reject the null hypothesis at 
10% level that the corresponding coefficient is zero and accept the alternative one-sided hypothesis that 
the coefficient is greater than zero. 
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Table 7 Continued (B) Between-effect panel data regressions, 1993-2002 
Independent variable Full sample Firms with ownership data available 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Market-to-book ratio 0.007 (0.59) 
0.010 
(0.95) 
0.013 
(1.24) 
0.072** 
(2.80) 
0.068** 
(2.64) 
0.068** 
(2.63) 
Size 0.352*** (11.02) 
0.334*** 
(11.09) 
0.286*** 
(9.49) 
0.334*** 
(8.37) 
0.310*** 
(7.70) 
0.309*** 
(7.68) 
Net working capital/assets -1.009*** (-5.02) 
-0.956*** 
(-5.07) 
-1.245*** 
(-6.60) 
-1.302*** 
(-5.41) 
-1.231*** 
(-5.13) 
-1.228*** 
(-5.12) 
Cash flow/assets 1.481*** (3.64) 
1.150*** 
(2.96) 
1.149*** 
(3.01) 
5.002*** 
(7.76) 
4.945*** 
(7.72) 
4.931*** 
(7.69) 
Capital expenditure/assets -2.414*** (-3.29) 
-1.114 
(-1.60) 
-1.628** 
(-2.36) 
-2.101 
(-1.90) 
-2.185* 
(-1.98) 
-2.169* 
(-1.97) 
Leverage -3.324*** (-10.27) 
-3.478*** 
(-11.30) 
-3.657*** 
(-12.05) 
-3.167*** 
(-7.61) 
-3.201*** 
(-7.74) 
-3.182*** 
(-7.65) 
Dividend -0.497* (-2.13) 
-0.156 
(-0.70) 
-0.099 
(-0.45) 
0.360 
(1.20) 
0.423 
(1.42) 
0.430 
(1.44) 
Shareholder rights -0.400*** (-11.97)  
-0.266*** 
(-8.24) 
-0.165*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.221*** 
(-4.87) 
-0.220*** 
(-4.82) 
Creditor rights  -0.572*** (-19.00) 
-0.509*** 
(-16.66) 
-0.424*** 
(-9.51) 
-0.471*** 
(-10.23) 
-0.473*** 
(-10.24) 
Ownership     -1.109*** (-3.80) 
-1.619 
(-1.61) 
Ownership squared      0.556 (0.53) 
Constant -5.603*** (-10.74) 
-5.445*** 
(-11.41) 
-4.122*** 
(-8.31) 
-6.233*** 
(-9.20) 
-5.126*** 
(-6.98) 
-5.051*** 
(-6.75) 
N 6386 6386 6386 4576 4576 4576 
n 1960 1960 1960 1158 1158 1158 
R2 0.197 0.273 0.297 0.304 0.313 0.313 
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Table 7 Continued (C) Between-effect panel data regressions with the EMU dummy, 1993-2002 
Independent variable Full sample Firms with ownership data available 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Market-to-book ratio 0.009  (0.84) 
0.010  
(0.98) 
0.013  
(1.24) 
0.070**  
(2.77) 
0.068**  
(2.70) 
0.068**  
(2.70) 
Size 0.322*** (10.18) 
0.328*** 
(10.76) 
0.292*** 
(9.79) 
0.343*** 
(8.76) 
0.330*** 
(8.31) 
0.330*** 
(8.30) 
Net working 
capital/assets 
-1.143*** 
(-5.75) 
-0.994***  
(-5.20) 
-1.190***  
(-6.38) 
-1.265***  
(-5.37) 
-1.233***  
(-5.23) 
-1.233***  
(-5.23) 
Cash flow/assets 1.518*** (3.79) 
1.176*** 
(3.03) 
0.933**  
(2.47) 
4.553*** 
(7.18) 
4.561*** 
(7.20) 
4.561*** 
(7.19) 
Capital 
expenditure/assets 
-2.181***  
(-3.01) 
-1.182  
(-1.69) 
-1.534**  
(-2.25) 
-1.845  
(-1.70) 
-1.906  
(-1.76) 
-1.906  
(-1.76) 
Leverage -3.410***  (-10.70) 
-3.490***  
(-11.34) 
-3.712***  
(-12.38) 
-3.117*** 
(-7.65) 
-3.137***  
(-7.71) 
-3.138*** 
(-7.67) 
Dividend -0.433  (-1.88) 
-0.164  
(-0.73) 
0.018  
(0.08) 
0.581*  
(1.97) 
0.593*  
(2.01) 
0.593*  
(2.01) 
Shareholder rights -0.164***  (-3.71)  
-0.506***  
(-10.86) 
-0.458***  
(-7.76) 
-0.462***  
(-7.83) 
-0.462*** 
(-7.78) 
Creditor rights  -0.534***  (-12.28) 
-0.766***  
(-16.19) 
-0.759***  
(-11.83) 
-0.755***  
(-11.77) 
-0.755***  
(-11.76) 
DEMU 
1.130*** 
(7.98) 
0.178  
(1.21) 
-1.470*** 
 (-7.05) 
-1.859***  
(-7.12) 
-1.710***  
(-6.25) 
-1.711***  
(-6.22) 
Ownership     -0.536  (-1.78) 
-0.519  
(-0.52) 
Ownership squared      -0.018  (-0.02) 
Constant -6.728***  (-12.64) 
-5.569***  
(-11.41) 
-1.911***  
(-3.28) 
-3.516***  
(-4.59) 
-3.198***  
(-4.07) 
-3.200***  
(-4.03) 
N 6386 6386 6386 4576 4576 4576 
n 1960 1960 1960 1158 1158 1158 
R2 0.2225 0.2734 0.315 0.3334 0.3353 0.3353 
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 needed in my subsequent tests. To ensure that no bias is created by ignoring those 
observations with missing insider ownership data, I conduct tests on the full sample as 
well as the sample with insider ownership data available. As shown in Table 7 results 
discussed below, the coefficients of corporate liquidity determinants are similar for both 
these samples. Hence, in my subsequent analysis, I can focus on the sample with the 
insider ownership data available. 
 
a. Pooled OLS Cross-Country Regression Results  
In general, my estimation results are consistent with those obtained by previous studies 
in terms of the signs associated with determinants of corporate liquidity. Market-to-book 
ratio has a positive effect on corporate liquidity in all models. Size has a positive effect 
on corporate liquidity. Net working capital has a negative effect on corporate liquidity, 
confirming that net working capital and corporate liquidity are substitutes. Cash flow has 
a positive sign, suggesting that firms with high cash flow tend to have higher cash levels 
for the precautionary purpose. Consistent with Dittmar et al. (2003) as well as Kalcheva 
and Lins (2004), capital expenditure has a negative effect. According to Kalcheva and 
Lins (2004), this negative effect suggests that corporate liquidity increases if potential 
investment opportunities (proxied by capital expenditure) decline. Leverage proves to be 
negatively related to corporate liquidity, supporting the view that debt and cash are 
substitutes. I observe an insignificant effect of dividend payouts in all models except 
model 1.  
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Corporate governance variables turn out to be important determinants. Strong 
shareholder rights appear to reduce corporate liquidity, consistent with Dittmar et al.’s 
(2003) as well as Ferreira and Vilela’s (2004) findings; strong creditor rights appear to 
reduce corporate liquidity, consistent with Ferreira and Vilela’s (2004) findings. In 
addition, in models 5 and 6, I observe that higher insider ownership leads to lower 
corporate liquidity, substantiating the view that when insiders own more shares, they 
prefer to hold less cash because their interests are more in line with other shareholders. 
My OLS results from model 5 assume a simple linear relationship between insider 
ownership and corporate liquidity while the results from model 6 provide some evidence 
supporting a nonlinear relationship between ownership and liquidity.71 This finding is 
interesting since it implies that cash holdings decline as insider ownership increases, i.e., 
managers’ interests align with shareholders’; however, beyond a certain ownership level, 
cash holdings increase with insider ownership. Using Morck et al.’s (1998) reasoning, 
managers are entrenched beyond a particular ownership level and maintain high cash 
holdings for consuming perquisites.  
 
b. Between-Effect Panel Data Regression Results  
Since the nature of my data is both time-series and cross sectional, estimation with the 
panel data model is more appropriate. However, because I have variables that vary 
                                                 
 
71 The p-value for ownership squared in model 6 is 0.073, which enables us to reject the null hypothesis at 
10% level that the corresponding coefficient is zero and accept the alternative one-sided hypothesis that 
the coefficient is greater than zero. 
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across firms or countries but are constant over time (i.e., shareholder rights, creditor 
rights and insider ownership), the fixed effect panel data model is inappropriate for them. 
I instead use between-effect panel data model. This model averages each variable over 
time for each firm. The results so obtained are reported in Table 7 panel B and are 
similar to those obtained using OLS and reported in panel A. They confirm the negative 
impact of shareholder rights and creditor rights on cash holdings. Insider ownership has 
a negative impact on corporate liquidity as shown in model 5 results but no effects when 
ownership squared is introduced in model 6 which itself becomes insignificant. 
 In addition, I also performed between-effect panel data regressions by including 
an additional variable, i.e., the EMU dummy (Table 7 (C)). I introduce the EMU dummy 
because one of my goals in this chapter is to examine whether EMU firms distinguish 
themselves from non-EMU firms in corporate liquidity. In general, the effects of each 
determinant stay the same. For example, my key variables like shareholder rights and 
creditor rights continue to exert a negative impact on corporate liquidity. Insider 
ownership has the predicted sign, but the effect is not significant. Except for models 1 
and 2, the EMU dummy has a negative impact on corporate liquidity, suggesting the 
EMU firms generally have lower corporate liquidity as opposed to non-EMU firms, 
ceteris paribus.  
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Table 8 
Dynamic panel data regressions, 1993-2002 
 
The dependent variable for all models is the natural log of the ratio of cash and its equivalents to 
total assets (Cash). Lagged cash denotes Cash one year before. Market-to-book ratio is defined 
as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity 
divided by total assets. Size is the natural log of total assets. Net working capital is defined as 
total current assets less cash less total current liabilities. Cash flow is earnings before interest and 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), less interest, taxes, and common dividends. 
Capital expenditure/assets is additions to fixed assets over total assets. Leverage is total debt as a 
fraction of total assets. Dividend is common dividends as a fraction of earnings. Model 1 is the 
benchmark. Model 2 includes year dummy variables for the period 1993-2002. Model 3 includes 
year dummy variables and considers the endogeneity problem. Panel A presents regression 
results based on all data available. Panel B provides robustness check by using observations 
without missing ownership data. 
N represents the number of observations (firm-years) while n indicates the number of 
firms. Correlation 1 and 2 are test statistics for first and second order autocorrelations in 
residuals, respectively, distributed as standard normal N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. Sargan test is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under 
the null of instrument validity. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  
 (A)  Full sample 
(B) 
Firms with ownership data available 
Independent variable Basic  regression 
Regression including 
year dummies 
Regression 
including 
year 
dummies 
and 
accounting 
for 
endogeneity 
Basic  
regression 
Regression 
including  
year 
dummies 
Regression 
including 
year 
dummies 
and 
accounting 
for 
endogeneity 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Lagged cash 0.401***  (4.39) 
0.390***  
(4.34) 
0.112***  
(8.87) 
0.296 *** 
(3.13) 
0.228**  
(2.55) 
0.038***  
(3.16) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.042**  (2.66) 
0.040**  
(2.54) 
-0.021*  
(-2.12) 
0.061***  
(2.86) 
0.039  
(1.66) 
-0.023*  
(-2.15) 
Size 0.290***  (2.87) 
0.378***  
(3.04) 
0.462***  
(9.38) 
0.279**  
(2.47) 
0.447***  
(3.14) 
0.598***  
(11.92) 
Net working capital/assets -1.404***  (-4.41) 
-1.365***  
(-4.30) 
-2.766***  
(-22.66) 
-1.379***  
(-4.09) 
-1.386***  
(-4.16) 
-3.160*** 
(-26.73) 
Cash flow/assets 0.628  (1.44) 
0.491  
(1.09) 
1.046***  
(5.09) 
0.541  
(1.06) 
0.409  
(0.80) 
0.483**  
(2.48) 
Capital expenditure/assets -1.611**  (-2.83) 
-1.791***  
(-3.18) 
-0.457*  
(-2.20) 
-1.379**  
(-2.71) 
-1.683***  
(-3.34) 
-0.942***  
(-4.86) 
Leverage -1.126***  (-3.07) 
-1.153***  
(-2.93) 
-2.322***  
(-16.65) 
-1.062**  
(-2.61) 
-1.236**  
(-2.81) 
-2.776***  
(-18.81) 
Dividend -0.112  (-1.18) 
-0.156  
(-1.67) 
0.186**  
(2.29) 
-0.222*  
(-2.14) 
-0.255**  
(-2.52) 
-0.245***  
(-2.88) 
Constant 0.033***  (0.01) 
0.047***  
(0.02) 
0.095***  
(11.91) 
0.039***  
(3.10) 
0.064***  
(3.88) 
0.113***  
(16.24) 
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Table 8 Continued 
 (A)  Full sample 
(B) 
Firms with ownership data available 
Independent variable Basic  regression 
Regression including 
year dummies 
Regression 
including 
year 
dummies and 
accounting 
for 
endogeneity 
Basic  
regression 
Regression 
including  
year 
dummies 
Regression 
including 
year 
dummies and 
accounting 
for 
endogeneity 
 1 2 3 1 2 3 
N 2689 2689  2689 2164 2164 2164 
n 785 785 785 615 615 615 
Correlation 1 -5.09 -4.98 -5.45 -4.11 -3.73 -4.60 
Correlation 2 -1.75 -1.68 -1.99 -1.49 -1.50 -1.36 
Sargan test (df)72 47.17 (35) 46.29 (35) 286.1 (280) 46.88 (35) 47.57 (35) 260.89 (280) 
 
 
 
2. Dynamic Panel Data Estimation 
In general, my estimation results from the simple OLS and between-effect panel data 
regressions are consistent with previous findings. I now discuss the results obtained from 
the dynamic panel data model, which are the focus of this chapter. Table 8 provides the 
basic estimation results derived from models comparable to those in Table 7 while Table 
9 estimation extends Table 8 analysis by additionally examining how corporate liquidity 
is affected by other governance variables at both country and firm levels like shareholder 
                                                 
 
72 Our Sargan test results suggest that we reject the null hypothesis that residuals and instruments are 
independent for models 1 and 2 at 10% level but fail to reject it for model 3, suggesting model 3 with year 
dummies included and endogeneity problem considered is an appropriate specification. Thus, model 3 in 
Table 4 serves as the benchmark for dynamic panel data estimation in the following tables. 
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Table 9 
Dynamic panel data regressions accounting for endogeneity with corporate governance variables, 
1993-2002 
 
The dependent variable for all models is the natural log of the ratio of cash and its equivalents to 
total assets (Cash). Lagged cash denotes Cash one year before. Market-to-book ratio is defined 
as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity 
divided by total assets. Size is the natural log of total assets. Net working capital is defined as 
total current assets less cash less total current liabilities. Cash flow is earnings before interest and 
taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), less interest, taxes, and common dividends. 
Capital expenditure/assets is additions to fixed assets over total assets. Leverage is total debt as a 
fraction of total assets. Dividend is common dividends as a fraction of earnings. Shareholder 
rights and creditor rights are summary measures of shareholder and creditor protection, ranging 
from 0 to 6 and 0 to 4, respectively. Both variables are derived from La Porta et al. (1998). 
Ownership represents shares held by insiders as a fraction of common shares outstanding. 
Ownership squared represents the square of ownership. D98 takes on a value of 1 if the year is 
1998 or later and 0 otherwise. DEMU takes on 1 if a firm belongs to EMU and 0 otherwise. The 
year dummy variables for the period 1993-2002 are included for all models but their coefficients 
are not shown in the table. 
N represents the number of observations (firm-years) while n indicates the number of 
firms. Correlation 1 and 2 are test statistics for first and second order autocorrelations in 
residuals, respectively, distributed as standard normal N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. Sargan test is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under 
the null of instrument validity. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Independent variable Full sample Firms with ownership data available 
 1 2 3 4 
Lagged cash 0.105***  (7.64) 
0.032** 
(2.69) 
0.033** 
(2.74) 
0.037***  
(3.13) 
Market-to-book ratio -0.024** (-2.42) 
-0.031*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.036*** 
(-3.50) 
-0.037*** 
(-3.45) 
Size 0.479***  (11.48) 
0.608*** 
(12.21) 
0.615***  
(12.29) 
0.580***  
(10.73) 
Net working capital/assets -2.728*** (-22.07) 
-3.232*** 
(-27.56) 
-3.257*** 
(-27.65) 
-3.261*** 
(-25.92) 
Cash flow/assets 1.086***  (4.88) 
0.489**  
(2.52) 
0.414* 
(2.16) 
0.386 
(1.93) 
Capital expenditure/assets -0.413* (-1.96) 
-0.854***  
(-4.41) 
-0.861*** 
(-4.35) 
-0.818*** 
(-3.96) 
Leverage -2.167*** (-14.64) 
-2.779***  
(-18.94) 
-2.766*** 
(-18.91) 
-2.628*** 
(-15.13) 
Dividend 0.190** (2.35) 
-0.271***  
(-3.12) 
-0.321*** 
(-3.65) 
-0.329*** 
(-3.83) 
D98* DEMU 
-0.178*** 
(-3.01) 
-0.288***  
(-4.62) 
-0.265*** 
(-4.19) 
-0.248*** 
(-3.42) 
D98*Shareholder rights 0.015 (0.68) 
0.005  
(0.22) 
0.003 
(0.13) 
0.016 
(0.73) 
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Table 9 Continued 
Independent variable Full sample Firms with ownership data available 
 1 2 3 4 
D98*Creditor rights -0.066*** (-3.05) 
-0.099***  
(-4.34) 
-0.097*** 
(-4.11) 
-0.096*** 
(-3.80) 
D98*ownership   -0.046 (-0.54) 
-0.746* 
(-2.15) 
D98*ownership squared    0.750* (2.00) 
Constant 0.075***  (5.17) 
0.073***  
(4.94) 
0.071***  
(4.54) 
0.058***  
(3.38) 
N 2685 2164 2164 2164 
n 784 615 615 615 
Correlation 1 -5.30 -4.55 -4.57 -4.54 
Correlation 2 -2.11 -1.42 -1.41 -1.46 
Sargan test (df)73 287.61 (280) 258.80 (280) 258.95 (280) 259.01 (280) 
 
 
rights, creditor rights and insider ownership. Table 10 presents results derived by 
interacting the EMU dummy and the determinants of corporate liquidity to see if the 
creation of EMU has changed the way the determinants affect corporate liquidity during 
the test period. 
I start with Table 8, which reports dynamic panel data model results to provide a 
comparison with OLS model results of Table 7.74 Table 8 consists of panels A and B. 
Panel A presents the estimation results using the full sample. Panel B provides a 
                                                 
 
73 Our Sargan test results suggest that we fail to reject the null hypothesis of residuals and instruments 
being independent throughout all models in Tables 5 and 6. 
74 Table 4 does not include static variables such as shareholder rights, creditor rights and insider ownership 
because these static variables will take a value of zero after the first differencing, the first step of dynamic 
panel estimation. 
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Table 10 
Dynamic panel data regressions accounting for endogeneity, 1993-2002 
Impact of EMU on sensitivity of corporate liquidity to its determinants 
 
This table introduces interaction variables to measure any unique effects due to the introduction 
of the euro, D98, on the coefficients of the determinants of corporate liquidity. The dependent 
variable for all models is the natural log of the ratio of cash and its equivalents to total assets 
(Cash). Lagged cash denotes Cash one year before. Market-to-book ratio is defined as the book 
value of total assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by total 
assets. Size is the natural log of total assets. Net working capital is defined as total current assets 
less cash less total current liabilities. Cash flow is earnings before interest and taxes, depreciation 
and amortization (EBITDA), less interest, taxes, and common dividends. Capital 
expenditure/assets is additions to fixed assets over total assets. Leverage is total debt as a 
fraction of total assets. Dividend is common dividends as a fraction of earnings. Shareholder 
rights and creditor rights are summary measures of shareholder and creditor protection, ranging 
from 0 to 6 and 0 to 4, respectively. Both variables are derived from La Porta et al. (1998). 
Ownership represents shares held by insiders as a fraction of common shares outstanding. 
Ownership squared represents the square of ownership. D98 takes on 1 if the year is 1998 or 
after 1998 and 0 otherwise. DEMU takes on 1 if a firm belongs to EMU and 0 otherwise. The year 
dummy variables for the period 1993-2002 are included for all models but their coefficients are 
not shown in the table. Only observations with ownership data available were used for 
estimation. 
N represents the number of observations (firm-years) while n indicates the number of 
firms. Correlation 1 and 2 are test statistics for first and second order autocorrelations in 
residuals, respectively, distributed as standard normal N(0,1) under the null of no serial 
correlation. Sargan test is a test of over-identifying restrictions, distributed as chi-square under 
the null of instrument validity. Z-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate the 
coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Independent variable Basic  Model 
Model including 
shareholder 
rights and 
creditor rights 
Model including 
shareholder 
rights, creditor 
rights and 
ownership 
 1 2 3 
Lagged cash 0.042*** (13.56) 
0.031*** 
(9.67) 
0.034*** 
(10.61) 
DEMU *Lagged cash 0.002   (0.28) 
0.011 
(1.36) 
0.009 
(1.10) 
Market-to-book ratio 0.012***   (3.10) 
0.018*** 
(4.82) 
0.023*** 
(5.26) 
DEMU *Market-to-book ratio -0.066*** (-13.67) 
-0.079*** 
(-15.47) 
-0.090*** 
(-18.53) 
Size 0.885***  (0.021) 
0.859*** 
(38.34) 
0.860*** 
(36.71) 
Net working capital/assets -1.373***  (-28.60) 
-1.149*** 
(-26.19) 
-1.174*** 
(-22.86) 
DEMU *Net working capital/assets -0.846***  (-8.44) 
-1.065*** 
(-11.6) 
-1.003*** 
(-10.08) 
Cash flow/assets 3.249***  (27.71) 
3.428*** 
(31.06) 
3.424*** 
(32.52) 
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Table 10 Continued 
Independent variable Basic  Model 
Model including 
shareholder 
rights and 
creditor rights 
Model including 
shareholder 
rights, creditor 
rights and 
ownership 
 1 2 3 
DEMU *Cash flow/assets -2.965***  (-19.08) 
-3.299***  
(-20.6) 
-3.462*** 
(-22.54) 
Capital expenditure/assets -1.325***  (0.080) 
-1.366*** 
(-20.96) 
-1.373***  
(-19.86) 
Leverage -2.315***  (-42.13) 
-2.267*** 
(-40.43) 
-2.226*** 
(-40.30) 
DEMU *Leverage -0.549***  (-3.90) 
-0.635*** 
(-4.83)  
-0.703*** 
(-5.42) 
Dividend -0.137***  (0.025) 
-0.124*** 
(-7.30) 
-0.208*** 
(-8.57) 
D98*Shareholder rights  
0.191*** 
(13.88) 
0.241*** 
(16.23) 
D98* DEMU *Shareholder rights  
-0.253*** 
(-8.95) 
-0.315*** 
(-10.46) 
D98*Creditor rights  -0.235*** (-9.29) 
-0.339*** 
(-12.37) 
D98* DEMU *Creditor rights  
0.135*** 
(8.26) 
0.225*** 
(13.65) 
D98*ownership   -1.584*** (-9.02) 
D98*ownership squared   1.307*** (6.12) 
Constant 0.132***  (0.002) 
0.098*** 
(13.84) 
0.036*** 
(0.008) 
N 2164 2164 2164 
n 615 615 615 
Correlation 1 -4.62 -4.60 -4.61 
Correlation 2 -1.43 -1.48 -1.49 
Sargan test (df) 392.97 (455) 394.44 (455) 386.94 (455) 
 
 
robustness check to panel A by including only those observations for which insider 
ownership data is available. In both panels, models 1 and 2 treat the determinants of 
corporate liquidity as exogenous while model 3 treats them as endogenous by using all 
their lagged values as instruments of each determinant. Focusing on panel A, in model 1, 
which serves as the benchmark, the signs are identical to those observed in Table 7 
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except that the coefficient for cash flow/assets is insignificant. Model 2 includes year 
dummies and the results obtained are very similar to those of model 1. When I account 
for the endogeneity problem as well as time effects in model 3, the most noticeable 
change is that the sign of market-to-book ratio changes from positive to negative. This 
finding of a negative relationship between cash holdings and market-to-book ratio is 
different from the results of Dittmar et al. (2003) as well as Ferreira and Vilela (2004), 
which were obtained using OLS. Based upon their results, Dittmar et al. (2003) and 
Ferreira and Vilela (2004) had concluded that managers hold high cash balances in 
anticipation of high future investment opportunities. My endogeneity-adjusted results 
lead to the opposite inference. They suggest that managers are inclined to hold more 
cash in response to poor investment opportunities as predicted by the agency theory. In 
addition, accounting for endogeneity, profitability as proxied by cash flow/assets has a 
significantly positive sign as observed in Table 7, confirming the precautionary motive 
for holding cash. The above two findings in model 3 as well as others are also observed 
in results reported in panel B, obtained using only observations with insider ownership 
data available. The only difference is that dividend exhibits a consistent negative effect 
in all models of panel B as compared to Panel A, where dividend shows a significant 
positive effect only in model 3. 
In models 1 through 3 of both panels, I observe a significant positive coefficient 
for the lagged dependent variable, meaning that corporate liquidity one year before has 
significant explanatory power. This suggests that adjustment in cash holdings is costly 
such that instantaneous adjustment is not possible. In addition, my Sargan test results 
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show that I reject the null hypothesis that residuals and instruments are independent for 
models 1 and 2 at 10% level, but I fail to reject the null hypothesis for model 3, 
suggesting that model 3 with year dummies included and endogeneity problem 
accounted for is the appropriate specification. Thus, model 3 in Table 8 serves as the 
basis for my dynamic panel data models whose results are reported in Tables 5 and 6. 
Table 9 is an extension of Table 8 and includes interaction variables whose 
construction is defined below. As noted earlier, my three governance variables vary 
across firms or countries but are constant over time, i.e., they are static variables. Since 
dynamic panel data analysis entails first differences, static variables take a value of zero 
and get eliminated from the analysis. To include these static variables in my analysis, I 
convert them to dynamic variables by interacting them with the euro dummy, D98. This 
procedure makes the interacted value of the static variables zero for each year before 
1998 and non-zero in 1998 and subsequent years, i.e., this new variable is not constant 
over time and therefore can be incorporated in the dynamic panel data analysis. Given its 
construction, the first differences of this variable will be non-zero in only one year, 1998. 
Hence, results obtained for these variables should be interpreted in this context. I apply 
the same procedure to the EMU dummy variable, DEMU. The first difference of its 
interaction variable will equal 1 in 1998 for EMU firms only and 0 for all other years 
and for all non-EMU firms.75 
                                                 
 
75 Assume the coefficient for the EMU dummy is β. Given that LL ++=− EMUDyy β19971998 , 
)y(y 19971998 − will change by β  if 1DEMU = , i.e., if a firm belongs to the EMU. Further assume 
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 There are four models in Table 9. Model 1 uses the full sample as a robustness 
check while model 2 uses only those firms with insider ownership data available. All 
models include the EMU dummy, shareholder rights and creditor rights. Models 3 and 4 
introduce insider ownership as an additional determinant of corporate liquidity. More 
specifically, model 3 assumes a linear relationship between insider ownership and 
corporate liquidity while model 4 assumes a non-linear relationship between the two. 
In general, the results in Table 9 are consistent with those in model 3 of Table 8. 
For example, corporate liquidity in year 1t −  continues to exert a significant influence 
on corporate liquidity in year t . Market-to-book ratio has a consistently significant 
negative effect, consistent with the prediction of the agency theory. Size has a positive 
impact on corporate liquidity. Net working capital is a substitute for corporate liquidity 
as predicted. The positive sign of cash flow suggests that management tends to retain 
more cash when cash flow is higher, consistent with findings of Dittmar et al. (2003). 
Capital expenditure has a negative impact on corporate liquidity. The negative 
coefficient for leverage suggests that debt and cash are substitutes. As observed in Table 
8, in Table 9, the effect of dividend is positive in model 1 using the full sample, but 
negative for models 2 through 4 using the sample with insider ownership data available.  
Next, I discuss the effects of the EMU dummy, shareholder rights, creditor rights 
and insider ownership on cash holdings. As mentioned earlier, their coefficients are 
based upon observations for year 1998 but are obtained using a much more robust 
                                                                                                                                                
 
1997y  is constant. Then we will have βΔy1998 =  if 1DEMU = . The same logic applies to shareholder 
rights, creditor rights and insider ownership. 
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methodology than OLS and after adjusting for any endogeneity problems in the other 
determinants of corporate liquidity. The coefficient for the EMU dummy is significantly 
negative in all models, suggesting that the EMU firms see a reduction in corporate 
liquidity during the transition to the euro in 1998 compared to the non-EMU firms, 
ceteris paribus. This is consistent with the negative coefficient of the EMU dummy 
observed in the between-regression results (Table 7 (C)). Unlike previous studies, 
shareholder rights do not show a significant effect on corporate liquidity. Stronger 
creditor rights continue to have a significantly negative effect on corporate liquidity. 
From the results in model 4, I continue to observe a non-linear relationship between 
insider ownership and corporate liquidity. 
 
a. Impact of EMU on Sensitivity of Corporate Liquidity to Its Determinants 
I now discuss results estimated by interacting determinants of corporate liquidity and the 
EMU dummy variable to discern the unique effect of the monetary union by examining 
how EMU has changed the sensitivity of corporate liquidity to its determinants (Table 
10). In particular, I are interested in estimating the coefficients of the DEMU interaction 
variables associated with market-to-book ratio, net working capital, cash flow, capital 
expenditure and leverage.  
 The coefficient for market-to-book ratio is significantly positive by itself but 
significantly negative for its corresponding interaction variable. This implies that the 
effect of market-to-book ratio on corporate liquidity is positive for the non-EMU firms 
but negative for the EMU firms, suggesting that the generally negative effect of market-
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to-book ratio observed in Table 9 is predominated by the negative effect observed here 
for the EMU firms. Since the agency theory predicts a negative effect of market-to-book 
ratio, it appears that the agency theory explanation of corporate liquidity applies more 
strongly to the EMU firms. 
Size has a positive impact on corporate liquidity for both EMU and non-EMU 
firms. I find net working capital to be a substitute for corporate liquidity for the non-
EMU firms. The significant negative coefficient for the corresponding DEMU interaction 
variable suggests that net working capital is more substitutable for cash in EMU than in 
non-EMU countries. This suggests that the establishment of the EMU has strengthened 
the substitution effect of net working capital for the EMU firms, i.e., their net working 
capital can be more readily converted into cash for reasons related to the formation of 
the monetary union. 
Cash flow has a positive impact on corporate liquidity for the non-EMU firms. 
The coefficient for the corresponding interaction variable for EMU firms is significantly 
negative. If I sum up the coefficient for cash flow and its corresponding interaction 
variable, I still obtain positive coefficient for cash flow in the first two models but 
slightly negative in the third model. The reduction in the sensitivity to cash flow 
suggests that EMU firms have a weaker precautionary motive for holding cash. In other 
words, the EMU firms keep relatively less cash as compared to the non-EMU firms in 
response to an increase in cash flow. 
The coefficient for capital expenditure is significantly negative in all models, 
consistent with the findings of previous research. I had also observed significantly 
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negative coefficient for this variable all through Tables 3, 4 and 5. All this suggests that 
investment opportunities as proxied by capital expenditure have a negative effect on 
corporate liquidity. In addition, compared to market-to-book ratio, capital expenditure 
appears to be a better proxy for investment opportunities because its effect on corporate 
liquidity is not subject to the model specifications in my study. After controlling for 
other corporate governance variables, the negative effect of investment opportunities on 
corporate liquidity suggests that the management tends to hold more cash in response to 
poor investment opportunities. This observation is consistent with the prediction of the 
agency theory.  
The effect of leverage is significantly negative for the non-EMU firms. Given the 
significant negative effect of its corresponding interaction variable, establishing the 
EMU appears to strengthen the substitution effect between debt and cash for the EMU 
firms. This may be due to or signal an enhanced integration of capital markets in the 
EMU countries. Overall, my results show that cash and debt are substitutes. In fact, 
given that cash and debt are primary financing sources for investments, factors affecting 
debt should affect cash in an opposite way. As pointed out by Opler et al. (1999), 
“variables that make debt costly for a firm are variables that make cash advantageous”. 
Firms with higher investment opportunities (as proxied by market-to-book ratio) should 
have lower debt financing cost and thus borrow more (Myers 1977; Chen and Zhao 
2005). According to the above reasoning, the positive relationship between investment 
opportunities and leverage implies a negative relationship between investment 
opportunities and cash, which is generally what I observe in Tables 3 through 6.   
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Regarding dividend, I observe a significantly negative coefficient for all firms. 
The observed inverse relationship between dividend and corporate liquidity supports the 
notion that less financially constrained firms, i.e., firms paying higher dividend, hold less 
cash (Almeida et al. 2004).   
Moving from the basic model 1 to the next two models, which include other 
corporate governance variables, I observe some interesting results. During the transition 
to the monetary union, non-EMU firms had a positive impact of shareholder rights on 
corporate liquidity. The DEMU interaction variable for shareholder rights has a significant 
negative coefficient in both models 2 and 3. As a result, the net effect of shareholder 
rights for EMU firms is negative and consistent with results in Table 7. The opposite 
effect of shareholder rights on cash holdings of EMU and non-EMU firms suggests that 
shareholder rights are an inconsistent determinant of corporate liquidity. On the other 
hand, creditor rights have a negative impact on corporate liquidity for non-EMU firms. 
The effect of the corresponding interaction variable is positive in both models. However, 
if I sum up these two coefficients in each model, the net result is still negative, meaning 
that EMU firms see a negative but weaker effect of creditor rights on corporate liquidity 
for non-EMU firms. The net effect of creditor rights on corporate liquidity for both 
groups of firms is negative. Lastly, I continue to observe a non-linear relationship 
between insider ownership and corporate liquidity. 
In summary, my results corroborate the importance of country-specific corporate 
governance variables (i.e., key factors affecting agency costs) in determining corporate 
liquidity. The observation of a consistently negative impact of creditor rights on cash 
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holdings for all countries (as opposed to shareholder rights) suggests that creditor rights 
play a more dominant role in determining corporate cash holdings. In addition, the fact 
that I observe a consistent negative effect of creditor rights as opposed to an inconsistent 
effect of shareholder rights on corporate liquidity reiterates the fact that cash and debt 
are closer in terms of substitutability than cash and equity. Hence, ignoring creditor 
rights and focusing on shareholder rights, as is common in existing literature on multi-
country corporate liquidity, is inappropriate.  
The observation of a significant negative coefficient for the EMU dummy in 
Table 9, revealing that in multivariate setting, the transition to a monetary union is 
associated with a significant reduction in corporate liquidity in the EMU firms than in 
non-EMU firms. This may be a positive sign for those countries that have joined the 
monetary union and adopted a common currency. If other factors that affect corporate 
liquidity are losing their impact over time, corporate liquidity may fall eventually in 
these EMU firms due to all measures taken along with the establishment of EMU and the 
adoption of a common currency. In addition, from the results associated with interaction 
variables involving the EMU dummy, it appears that for EMU firms, cash and debt are 
more substitutable, and so are cash and net working capital. The precautionary motive 
for holding cash has become weaker for the EMU firms than for non-EMU firms.  
My finding of a nonlinear relationship between cash holdings and ownership are 
consistent with the agency theory explanation. Corporate liquidity falls as insider 
ownership rises when the ownership is low. However, beyond a point, corporate cash 
holdings start rising as insider ownership increases and the management become more 
 
 
 
98
entrenched.76  Finally, past corporate liquidity appears to enter the managerial decision-
making about cash management given that the coefficient on the lag of corporate 
liquidity is significantly different from zero in Tables 8 through 10. This suggests that 
liquidity adjustment is costly and immediate adjustment is not possible, suggesting the 
need to include the lagged corporate liquidity variable as a determinant of corporate 
liquidity in future studies. 
 
3. Theoretical Implications 
As was noted earlier, it is difficult to make unambiguous statements about which of the 
three theories (i.e., tradeoff, financing hierarchy and agency) best explains corporate 
liquidity, as they do not lead to mutually exclusive predictions. Not withstanding this, 
my results do shed more light on this issue. The observation that creditor rights and 
shareholder rights as well as insider ownership exert influence on corporate liquidity 
suggests that, corporate liquidity is significantly affected by the agency theory variables. 
The negative effect of investment opportunities as proxied by market-to-book ratio in 
some cases and capital expenditure in all cases is in line with the prediction of the 
agency theory, according to which managers tend to hold more cash when the 
investment opportunities are poor.  
The creation of a monetary union and a common currency has uniquely affected 
the corporate liquidity of firms in that union. This can be seen from how this economic 
                                                 
 
76 Morck et al. (1988) observe a nonlinear relationship between insider ownership and firm value (instead 
of corporate liquidity in my paper) and use a similar agency theory explanation for their results. 
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event has affected corporate liquidity itself as well as the coefficients of its determining 
factors.  I show that introducing the euro has partially reduced corporate liquidity for the 
EMU firms. This finding can further be explained by the following reasons: One, the 
immediate result of adopting the common currency is transparency and lower transaction 
costs, which should make cash and other liquid assets more substitutable and lower the 
demand for corporate liquidity. Two, capital markets in the EMU countries have become 
more integrated with the introduction of the euro, which catalyzes other reforms to 
enhance the capital market integration (Bris et al. 2004; Askari and Chaterjee 2005). It 
follows that firms should have easier access to capital markets and therefore reduce their 
tendency to hoard “non-earning” cash. In fact, I also find that EMU strengthened the 
negative effects of net working capital and debt during the entire period 1993-2002, 
suggesting higher substitutability between net working capital and cash and lower 
demand for cash as a financing source for “liquidity shortfalls” of the EMU firms in the 
entire test period. Additionally, EMU weakens the precautionary motive for holding cash 
given that EMU has a negative effect on sensitivity of corporate liquidity to cash flow.  
 
G. Conclusion  
Many determinants of corporate liquidity have been identified in the literature. More 
recently, shareholder rights have been shown to affect corporate liquidity. I argue that 
since cash is closer to debt than equity, creditor rights should also affect cash holdings. 
My results suggest that country-specific corporate governance variables, in particular, 
creditor rights, play an important role in explaining corporate liquidity. Creditor rights 
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have a consistent negative impact on corporate liquidity for all 15 EU countries analyzed 
in this chapter. In contrast, the influence of shareholder rights depends on whether a 
country belongs to the EMU or not. In light of my results, creditor rights should not be 
ignored in future international corporate liquidity research. In addition, after controlling 
for country-specific corporate governance variables, firm-specific characteristics like 
market-to-book ratio, capital expenditure and insider ownership influence corporate 
liquidity in a way that supports the agency theory explanation of cash holdings.  
The recent formation of the Economic and Monetary Union and adoption of a 
common currency, considered by many as the most significant innovation in 
international markets, provided us a unique opportunity to study the effect of such macro 
changes on firm level data. I find that the adoption of a common currency influences 
corporate liquidity in many ways. The apparent consequences of the whole 
harmonization process include reduced transaction costs and more integrated capital 
markets for the countries participating in the monetary union as compared to the non-
EMU countries that chose not to. Indeed, I find that cash and debt are better substitutes 
for EMU firms, consistent with a more integrated capital markets in the member states. I 
also provide evidence that net working capital and cash are better substitutes for EMU 
firms, implying that reduced transaction costs make net working capital more readily 
convertible into cash for EMU firms than for non-EMU firms. Moreover, the propensity 
to retain cash from cash flow is lower for EMU firms probably due to easier access to 
capital markets and thus reduced demand for cash as a financing source for future 
investments. Further, my results suggest that EMU firms see a potential reduction in 
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corporate liquidity during the transition to a monetary union and the adoption of a 
common currency. 
Finally, by contrasting the results of OLS with those of the dynamic panel data 
model, I show that dealing with the endogeneity problem associated with the 
determinants of corporate liquidity methodologically is important. Unlike previous 
studies, I observe a negative effect of investment opportunities as proxied by market-to-
book ratio on corporate liquidity after accounting for the endogeneity problem. In 
conjunction with my other results, this finding supports the agency theory explanation of 
cash holdings. In addition, I show that cash adjustment is costly and an instantaneous 
adjustment is not likely for all 15 EU countries, suggesting that empirical models for 
corporate liquidity should include the lag of corporate liquidity as a determinant.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The establishment of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) culminating in the adoption 
of the euro has received much global attention in international finance. This dissertation 
studies the potential effects of this macro change on purchasing power parity (PPP) and 
corporate cash holdings. 
The second chapter studies the euro and PPP, providing stronger evidence in 
favor of PPP compared to previous studies. Unlike results of previous studies, I find that 
PPP holds better between currency blocs than within a currency bloc. However, I obtain 
little evidence supporting PPP and price convergence in most EMU countries since the 
adoption of the euro. My results show that the euro area may not be an optimum 
currency area as claimed by some researchers and policy makers. The Maastricht Treaty 
required member countries to converge in monetary and fiscal policies prior to the euro. 
However, will this convergence continue after the euro’s adoption? Some member 
countries are likely to deviate from the convergence criteria because they have excessive 
budget deficits, which can result in inflation that exceeds the target level. In addition, 
cross-border barriers such as labor immobility (sometimes due to regional cultural ties) 
prevalent in Europe can hinder economic integration as well. These problems may 
partially explain why PPP performance has not improved after the adoption of a 
common currency. Compared to previous experiments with the floating-rate and target-
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zone arrangement regimes, the common currency regime does not appear to be as 
successful in converging prices based upon my empirical evidence. My results suggest 
the importance of floating exchange rates despite the volatility inherent in them. 
My findings suggest the need for further dismantling of barriers as well as more 
disciplined and harmonized policy implementation by the EMU governments. However, 
diverging market practices rooted in national traditions and historical experiences could 
also be contributing factors that require passage of time for the market to lose its 
memory. On the other hand, for a few EMU countries where PPP holds after the 
adoption of the euro, the speed of adjustment shows remarkable improvement, 
suggesting that perhaps the EMU economies’ price formation process is in transition. 
While it is clear that since the advent of a common currency, PPP performance has not 
improved, there are signs that after the transition stage, what may emerge is a more 
resilient and efficient market than before the monetary union. Nevertheless, this is only 
possible if benefits of dismantled barriers, policy convergence, monetary and fiscal 
discipline, exchange rate risk elimination, reduced transaction costs and economic 
integration outweigh the benefits of a floating-rate regime. 
Chapter III examines the effects of corporate governance and monetary union on 
corporate liquidity. Many determinants of corporate liquidity have been identified in the 
literature. More recently, shareholder rights have been shown to affect corporate 
liquidity. I argue that since cash is closer to debt than equity, creditor rights should also 
affect cash holdings. My results suggest that country-specific corporate governance 
variables, in particular, creditor rights, play an important role in explaining corporate 
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liquidity. Creditor rights have a consistent negative impact on corporate liquidity for all 
15 EU countries analyzed in this chapter. In contrast, the influence of shareholder rights 
depends on whether a country belongs to the EMU or not. In light of my results, creditor 
rights should not be ignored in future international corporate liquidity research. In 
addition, after controlling for country-specific corporate governance variables, firm-
specific characteristics like market-to-book ratio, capital expenditure and insider 
ownership influence corporate liquidity in a way that supports the agency theory 
explanation of cash holdings.  
The recent formation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and adoption 
of a common currency provided us a unique opportunity to study the effect of such 
macro changes on firm level data. I find that the adoption of a common currency 
influences corporate liquidity in the following ways. The apparent consequences of the 
whole harmonization process include reduced transaction costs and more integrated 
capital markets for the countries participating in the monetary union as compared to the 
non-EMU countries that chose not to. Indeed, I find that cash and debt are better 
substitutes for EMU firms, consistent with a more integrated capital markets in the 
member states. I also provide evidence that net working capital and cash are better 
substitutes for EMU firms, implying that reduced transaction costs make net working 
capital more readily convertible into cash for EMU firms than for non-EMU firms. 
Moreover, the propensity to retain cash from cash flow is lower for EMU firms probably 
due to easier access to capital markets and thus reduced demand for cash as a financing 
source for future investments. Further, my results suggest that EMU firms see a potential 
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reduction in corporate liquidity during the transition to a monetary union and the 
adoption of a common currency. 
Finally, by contrasting the results of OLS with those of the dynamic panel data 
model, I show that dealing with the endogeneity problem associated with the 
determinants of corporate liquidity methodologically is important. Unlike previous 
studies, I observe a negative effect of investment opportunities as proxied by market-to-
book ratio on corporate liquidity after accounting for the endogeneity problem. In 
conjunction with my other results, this finding supports the agency theory view of 
corporate cash holdings. In addition, I show that cash adjustment is costly and an 
instantaneous adjustment is not likely for all 15 EU countries, suggesting that empirical 
models for corporate liquidity should include the lag of corporate liquidity as a 
determinant. 
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APPENDIX A 
CRITICAL VALUES FOR PPP 
Simulation Model: , , 1 ,i t i i t i td d uα −= + +  
Notes: Statistics are defined as
( )
ˆ 1
ˆ
i
i
t
se
β
β
−= , which was derived using the approach similar to Abuaf and Jorion (1990). With the 
Frisch-Waugh-Lovell (FWL) theorem (Baltagi 1998), I were able to generate 
iβˆ without imposing the value ofα . The number of 
iterations is 5000. The one-sided critical values were generated at 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels based on the empirical distribution of t-
test statistics. 
(A) Critical values for PPP used in Table 1 
  1973:1-1979:3 1979:4-1998:4 1998:5-2004:1 
Country 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
Austria -5.495 -4.626 -4.152 -5.743 -4.773 -4.225 -5.845 -4.724 -4.250 
Belgium -9.267 -7.760 -6.974 -9.702 -8.026 -7.201 -6.220 -5.270 -4.626 
Finland -2.984 -2.419 -2.091 -1.529 -1.246 -1.117 -4.570 -3.804 -3.347 
France -2.312 -1.909 -1.695 -3.038 -2.510 -2.252 -6.216 -5.053 -4.473 
Germany -4.864 -4.020 -3.591 -6.153 -5.044 -4.498 -4.768 -3.904 -3.454 
Greece -1.429 -1.165 -1.014 -1.638 -1.307 -1.134 -1.176 -0.852 -0.657 
Ireland -2.787 -2.298 -2.003 -2.038 -1.655 -1.475 -4.270 -3.488 -3.110 
Italy -2.028 -1.626 -1.409 -1.869 -1.544 -1.354 -6.710 -5.664 -5.083 
Luxembourg -9.397 -7.665 -6.890 -9.983 -8.274 -7.370 -3.619 -2.843 -2.482 
Netherlands -4.053 -3.319 -2.868 -1.362 -1.095 -0.955 -3.635 -2.890 -2.518 
Portugal -1.456 -1.151 -1.011 -1.920 -1.522 -1.335 -3.981 -3.106 -2.679 
Spain -1.511 -1.213 -1.071 -2.129 -1.705 -1.486 -3.786 -3.028 -2.678 
Canada -2.376 -1.950 -1.743 -1.875 -1.562 -1.382 -1.537 -1.140 -0.964 
Japan -1.622 -1.317 -1.147 -0.984 -0.806 -0.711 -1.521 -1.157 -0.906 
Switzerland -2.734 -2.072 -1.784 -2.583 -2.053 -1.797 -2.000 -1.571 -1.334 
UK -3.110 -2.577 -2.323 -1.548 -1.232 -1.074 -1.569 -1.213 -1.012 
(B) Critical values for PPP used in Table 2 
  1973:1-1979:3 1979:4-1998:4 1998:5-2004:1 
Country 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
Austria -4.719 -3.959 -3.585 -5.041 -4.084 -3.619 -6.074 -5.091 -4.562 
Belgium -9.407 -7.856 -7.090 -10.445 -8.571 -7.643 -5.474 -4.552 -4.046 
Finland -2.975 -2.416 -2.122 -1.652 -1.351 -1.189 -4.798 -3.908 -3.496 
France -2.132 -1.753 -1.573 -3.155 -2.627 -2.349 -5.840 -4.785 -4.300 
Greece -1.554 -1.246 -1.076 -1.406 -1.116 -0.991 -2.571 -1.925 -1.561 
Ireland -2.912 -2.369 -2.066 -2.087 -1.734 -1.525 -4.264 -3.456 -3.033 
Italy -2.192 -1.769 -1.548 -1.905 -1.581 -1.392 -7.670 -6.418 -5.705 
Luxembourg -9.444 -7.717 -6.959 -10.328 -8.595 -7.678 -2.594 -2.099 -1.818 
Netherlands -4.132 -3.273 -2.856 -1.286 -1.061 -0.928 -3.602 -2.936 -2.562 
Portugal -1.620 -1.291 -1.101 -1.959 -1.585 -1.403 -3.973 -3.272 -2.852 
Spain -1.795 -1.427 -1.207 -2.242 -1.808 -1.586 -4.017 -3.275 -2.879 
Canada -3.456 -2.866 -2.527 -2.535 -2.132 -1.901 -1.936 -1.487 -1.212 
Japan -1.681 -1.357 -1.174 -1.107 -0.892 -0.785 -1.193 -0.879 -0.723 
Switzerland -2.556 -2.002 -1.705 -2.489 -2.023 -1.751 -3.298 -2.529 -2.130 
UK -3.045 -2.520 -2.264 -1.618 -1.321 -1.157 -1.530 -1.146 -0.953 
US -3.904 -3.242 -2.886 -2.631 -2.157 -1.921 -2.019 -1.605 -1.348 
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APPENDIX B 
SUMMARY OF THEORETICAL PREDICTIONS77 
Variable Theory
 Tradeoff Financing hierarchy Agency 
Investment opportunities + + - 
Size - + + 
Liquid asset substitutes -   
Profitability - +  
Leverage +/- - - 
Dividend payout -   
Investor protection    - 
Insider ownership   - 
Insider ownership squared    + 
 
                                                 
 
77 The blank indicates that the theory fails to predict the effect. 
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APPENDIX C 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
I assume that firms hold cash as a buffer to replenish a shortage of operating cash flow. 
In a given period, I assume that each firm, i, receives a cash flow distributed uniformly 
with upper, and lower bounds, M and –M.78   The management of each firm holds 
precautionary cash with an opportunity cost of r1. Since income is taxed at the rate τ, the 
after tax opportunity cost is τ11 rτ)(1r =− . Next, each firm has a threshold cash flow F, 
which is the least amount that a firm requires to service the suppliers of capital.79 If the 
firm receives cash flow less than F, it might be able to use the cash withheld to pay for 
the shortage of cash flow. However, if the amount of cash withheld is not enough to 
cover the shortage of cash flow, firms must turn to capital markets to meet their 
operational needs and incur a cost r2. Since interest is tax ( τ ) deductible, the after-tax 
cost of capital ( τ2r ) is a function of tax rate and leverage: 
( ) ( )τl,rkl-1τ)-(1klr 2edτ2 =⋅+⋅= , 
where l stands for leverage (i.e., the ratio of debt to total assets) ( )( )0,1l ∈ , dk denotes 
cost of debt and ek  denotes cost of equity (Brealey and Myers 2003). Before each period 
starts, there are three scenarios facing a firm holding the amount of cash C.  
                                                 
 
78 This is a result of normalization so that on average each firm’s normalized operating cash flow (cash 
flow hereafter) is zero. Baum et al. (2004) follows a similar procedure. 
79 If realized cash flow exceeds F, we assume firms return the extra amount to the investors. 
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 First, realized cash flow is higher than F, so the cost borne by the firm is the 
opportunity cost of holding cash, τ1i1 rCcost =  with probability 2M
tMp1
−= . 
 Second, realized cash flow is lower than F and the cash withheld is enough to 
cover cash flow shortage. In this case, in addition to the opportunity cost of holding cash, 
the firm incurs replenishing cost. The cost for this scenario is  
2
C
rCcost i1i2 += τ  with probability 2M
C
p i2 = . 
 Third, realized cash flow is lower than F, and the cash held is not enough to 
cover the shortage of cash flow. It follows that the firm must borrow money from capital 
markets at a cost τ2r . The total cost for this scenario is 
)r(1
2
CtM
CrCcost 2ii1i3
ττ +⋅−+++=  with probability 
2M
CtM
p i3
−+= . 
Therefore, before a given period starts, the management of the firm desires to 
minimize the expected total cost of holding cash,  
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ +⋅−+++⋅−++
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +⋅+⋅−=
⋅+⋅+⋅=
ττ
ττ
)r(1
2
CtMCrC
2M
CtM
2
CrC
2M
CrC
2M
tM
costpcostpcostp
E(cost)
2
i
i1i
i
i
1i
i
1i
332211
   (1) 
 
Taking the first order condition, I derive the equation for the optimal cash, 
 t)(M
r
2MrC
τ
2
τ
1*
i ++−=  . (3) 
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The following are relevant comparative statics derived from equation (3): 
 0
r
2M
r
C
τ
2
τ
1
*
i <−=∂
∂
; (4) 
 0
r
2Mr
r
C
2
2
1
2
*
i >=∂
∂
τ
τ
τ . (5) 
From equation (4), I observe that optimal corporate liquidity goes down as the 
opportunity cost ( τ1r ) of holding cash goes up. Results from equation (5) imply that 
optimal corporate liquidity goes up as the cost of raising capital ( τ2r ) rises.  
 Assume that r1 and r2 are functions of economic variables:  
)f(Xr 11 = ; )g(Xr 22 = , 
where X1 denotes a vector of variables that affect r1 while X2 denotes a vector of 
variables that affect r2; both X1 and X2 represent determinants of corporate liquidity. 
Since my test period incorporates a potential structural change (creation of EMU and 
introduction of euro), I introduce a dummy variable (d) to capture the effect of a 
structural change (like elimination of currency conversion costs and exchange rate risk 
associated with within-EMU transactions, enhanced market integration, etc.) on 
corporate liquidity and sensitivity of corporate liquidity to its determinants. Hence, the 
ideal function for optimal cash holdings should take the following form: 
 d),,X,h(Xd)),,g(X),,h(f(Xd),r,h(rC 212121i τττ === ττ ,  (6) 
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where d takes on 0 if the year is pre euro (1993-1997) and 1 for euro year  (1998-
2002).80  
In summary, my model has the feature of the tradeoff theory in the sense that I 
derive the optimal cash holdings by minimizing the expected total cost of holding cash. 
In addition, by assuming that the management uses cash first to replenish cash flow 
shortage, and only then raises funds from capital markets in the form of debt, only when 
running short of cash flow, my model also contains features of the financing hierarchy 
theory.  
Empirically, researchers do not use opportunity cost (r1) and cost of capital (r2) 
directly as determinants of corporate liquidity. Instead, they use various variables such 
as market-to-book ratio, total assets, net working capital, cash flow, capital expenditure, 
leverage and dividend payouts as determinants of latent variables r1 and r2 and therefore 
empirical proxies for corporate liquidity, to shed light on the validity of the three 
theories mentioned earlier. I follow the same procedure by including those determinants 
as well as new ones in my estimation model.  
                                                 
 
80 Determinants of corporate liquidity, X1 and X2, depend on the dummy d. As discussed later, we created 
interaction variables by multiplying determinants by d to capture the effect of the euro on the sensitivity of 
corporate liquidity to its determinants. 
 
 
 
122
APPENDIX D 
DESCRIPTION OF RAW DATA FROM COMPACT D WORLDSCOPE  
Variable Worldscope Definition 
Capital expenditures % total assets (Kexp) Additions to fixed assets/total assets*100 
Cash (000s) (CH) 
Money available for use in the normal operations of the 
company; the most liquid assets in a company; including 
cash on hand, undeposited checks, cash in banks, checks 
in transit, cash in escrow, restricted cash, money orders, 
letters of credit, demand deposits (non-interest bearing), 
mortgage bond proceeds held in escrow, drafts, post 
office checking/GIRO accounts, post office savings 
accounts, central bank deposits, bullion, bullion in transit, 
cashiers checks, credit card sales. 
Common equity ($000s) (CE) Common equity*fiscal year end exchange rate of the country the company is domiciled in (US$) 
Depreciation and amortization (000s) (DA) 
Depreciation represents the process of allocating the cost 
of depreciable assets to the accounting periods covered 
during its expected useful life to a business. Amortization 
relates to cost allocation for intangible assets such as 
patents and leasehold improvements, trademarks, 
bookplates, tools and film cost. 
Dividend payout (% earnings) – total dollar (Div) Common dividends (cash)/(net income before preferred dividends-preferred dividend requirement)*100 
Earnings before interest and taxes (000s) (EBIT) Earnings of a company before interest expense and income taxes 
Income taxes (000s) (IT) All income taxes levied on the income of a company by federal, state and foreign governments 
Interest expense on debt (000s) (IE) Service charge for the use of capital before the reduction for interest capitalized 
Market capitalization ($000s) (MC) 
Total market value of the company based on year end 
price and number of shares outstanding converted to US 
dollars using the year end exchange rate 
Net income (000s) (NI) 
Income after all operating and non-operating income and 
expense, reserves, income taxes, minority interest and 
extraordinary items 
Net property, plant and equipment (FA) Gross property, plant and equipment less accumulated reserves for depreciation, depletion and amortization 
Total assets ($000s) (TA_USD) Total assets of the company converted to US dollars using the fiscal year end exchange rate 
Total assets (000s) (TA) 
Sum of total current assets, long term receivables, 
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other 
investments, net property plant and equipment and other 
assets 
Total current assets (000s) (TCA) 
Cash and other assets that are reasonably expected to be 
realized in cash, sold or consumed within one year or one 
operating cycle 
Total current liabilities (000s) (TCL) Debt or other obligations that the company expects to satisfy within one year 
Total debt % total assets (Lev) (short term debt & current portion of long term debt + long term debt)/total assets*100 
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